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Summary 
In June 2013 the Commission published its consultation paper “Towards 
more effective EU merger control” whereby the Commission was seeking to 
i) extend the scope of the EU merger control to the acquisition of non-
controlling minority shareholdings and ii) reform the referral system. The 
paper proposed several options on how to successfully achieve the set 
objectives without creating undue burdens for businesses and opened up for 
a consultation period between June and September 2013 during which a 
considerable amount of stakeholders submitted their responses. Considering 
the tone of voice throughout the consultation paper it is fairly evident that 
the Commission is rather keen on introducing an additional toolkit 
providing it the possibility to intervene, investigate and, if appropriate, 
declare structural links compatible or incompatible within the ambit of the 
Merger Regulation.  The key drive for its concerns lies, among many 
factors, in economic theory and practical examples including the heavily 
debated Ryanair v Aer Lingus case.  
 
In January 2014 the New Implementing Merger Regulation entered into 
force containing amended provisions with regards to a new referral system 
but lacking the introduction of self-standing provisions controlling 
acquisitions of minority shareholdings. The reason hereof seems to lie in the 
fact that many of the respondents considered the extension as too far-
reaching and disproportionate to the perceived problem. The Commission 
labelled the objectives of its proposal as creating a “more effective and 
business-friendly Union”, an objective that, most stakeholders find 
contradictory as it rather creates additional burdens, increasing expenses and 
leads to less legal certainty in the business environment.  
 
This thesis aims to examine to what extent the proposed amendments would 
affect businesses if fully implemented by reviewing the underlying reasons 
for introducing a customized set of rules aiming at controlling creations of 
structural links. Accordingly, this paper will highlight the development of 
EU merger control, the current merger practice, the objectives and options 
of the proposal and the responses thereof as a step to fulfil the purpose of 
this thesis; namely exploring if merger regulation intervention conferring 
jurisdictional power for the Commission to intervene and reject acquisitions 
of (non –controlling) minority shareholdings will create undue burdens, 
increasing costs and lead to less legal certainty for businesses. This will be 
achieved by introducing a discussion of: “what is to come-character” and 
boil down to which system, if any, is the most beneficial for companies. By 
establishing this line of discussion, the author hopes that the thesis will 
serve as a basis for future research.    
 
 
 
 2 
Sammanfattning 
I juni 2013 publicerade Kommissionen ett diskussionsunderlag (hädanefter 
”förslaget”); ”Towards more effective EU merger Control” genom vilket 
Kommissionen sökte att i) utöka tillämpningsområdet av europeisk kontroll 
av företagskoncentrationer till att också omfatta förvärv av icke 
kontrollerande minoritetsandelar samt ii) reformera förfarandet av 
hänskjutande av koncentrationer. Förslaget föreslår flera alternativ till hur 
man, enligt Kommissionen, framgångsrikt skall möta de bestämda 
målsättningarna utan att skapa orimliga bördor för företag och öppnade upp 
för en diskussionsperiod mellan juli och september 2013 under vilken en 
betydande mängd intressenter skickade in deras svaromål till förslaget. Med 
tanke på det tonfall som genomsyrar förslaget är det förhållandevis 
uppenbart att Kommissionen är angelägen om att införa ytterligare rättsliga 
instrument vilka ger dem möjligheten att ingripa, undersöka och, vid behov, 
förklara icke kontrollerande minoritetsförvärv förenliga eller oförenliga med 
EU-rätten. De viktigaste, bland många faktorer, till Kommissionens oro 
grundar sig i ekonomisk teori och praktiska exempel, däribland det kraftigt 
debatterade Ryan Air v. Aer Lingus fallet.  
 
I januari 2014 trädde en ny koncentrationsförordning i kraft vilken innehöll 
ändrade bestämmelser rörande förfarandet av hänskjutningar av vissa 
koncentrationer men saknade fristående bestämmelser genom vilka 
Kommissionen ges exklusiv jurisdiktion att kontrollera vissa förvärv av 
minoritetsandelar. Anledning härom tycks ligga i det faktum att många av 
de inkommande svaromålen ansåg att de föreslagna förändringarna var 
alltför långtgående i förhållande till det presenterade problemet. 
Kommissionen redogjorde målen med förslaget som att ”skapa en mer 
effektiv och företagsvänlig Union”, mål som enligt många av de berörda 
aktörerna motsäger sig själv eftersom de snarare utgör ytterligare bördor och 
kostnader samt leder till minskad rättssäkerhet för företag.  
 
Denna uppsats syftar till att undersöka i vilken utsträckning de föreslagna 
ändringarna skulle påverka företagsklimatet om bestämmelser av förvärv av 
minoritetsandelar skulle införas i EU-rätten samt att undersöka de 
bakomliggande orsakerna till att införa ett sådant regelverk. Följaktligen 
avser denna uppsats att belysa utvecklingen av EU:s koncentrationskontroll, 
nuvarande koncentrationsutövning samt målen, alternativen och svaromålen 
till Kommissionens förslag som ett steg i att tillgodose syftet med denna 
uppsats, nämligen; att undersöka huruvida en reform av bestämmelserna i 
koncentrationsförordningen, vilka ger Kommissionen möjlighet att ingripa 
och refusera vissa förvärv av icke kontrollerande minoritetsandelar 
eventuellt kan ge upphov till orimliga bördor, ökade kostnader och/eller leda 
till mindre rättssäkerhet för berörda företag. Detta kommer att uppnås 
genom att föra en diskussion om ”vad som komma skall” och vill sedermera 
koncentreras till vilket alternativ, om något, är mest fördelaktigt för 
företagen. Genom att etablera en diskussion om vad framtiden har att bringa 
hoppas författaren att denna uppsats kommer att ligga till grund för framtida 
forskning. 
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Abbreviations 
BWB  Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde 
CC  UK Competition Commission 
CJEU  Court of Justice of the European Union 
ECSC   Treaty establishing the Coal and Steel  
  Community 
EEA  European Economic Area 
EEC   Treaty establishing the European Economic 
  Community 
EGC  European General Court 
EU  European Union 
EUMR  European Union Merger Regulation 
NCMS  Non-controlling Minority Shareholdings 
NCA(s)  The National Competition  Authorities 
OFT  UK Office of Fair Trading  
SIEC  Significant impediment to effective competition 
TCA  The Competition Authority (Ireland) 
TFEU  Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
Prima facie, combined forces between companies seem to merely bring 
benefits to the market economy. This notion of economic advantages and 
synergy effects stemming from mergers and acquisitions is in many cases 
correct, but what happens when such combined forces hinder other actors to 
enter the market? Even if merged or acquired companies may increase 
technical development, reduce costs and make companies work more 
efficient it could also distort the idea of a healthy competitive Union. In 
some cases, mergers and acquisitions by or between two or more 
undertakings could reduce competition by strengthening the dominant 
position and hence give rise to higher prices for consumers, reduce choices 
or create a less innovative market environment.2  
 
At this very moment, there is an extensive on-going debate whether the 
Commission shall have the possibility to review and, if appropriate 
intervene in acquisitions of (non-controlling) minority shareholdings. This 
entails that diverse interests must be considered with precaution to 
safeguard the attractiveness of investing in the internal market. It is indeed, 
due to rapid globalisation, among one of the Union’s most important tasks 
to create a market whereby companies, both within and outside the 
boundaries of the European Union, are enticed to invest. Therefore, 
safeguarding the attractiveness of the internal market is of vital importance 
in the context of positioning the Union as a future leading global market 
place, improving the growth and standard of the industry in the EU. One 
way to achieve this is by creating a legal framework that satisfies the 
Union’s interests without posing undue burdens on companies.   
 
The main objective of examining certain mergers and acquisitions is to 
prevent harmful effects on the competition that, instead of effectively 
contributing to a unified and well functioning internal market, may cause 
problems. Therefore, mergers and acquisitions going beyond national 
borders, constituting “Community dimension”, may be subject for the 
Commission’s review, whose drive is to ensure that a proposed merger or 
acquisition is suitable at a European level and under EU legislation.3 
Consequently, not all mergers and acquisitions are subject for review under 
current merger legislation. The Merger Regulation4 (the single most 
important legal instrument of merger control) and its associated notices, 
guidelines and annexes only covers mergers and acquisitions with 
Community dimension that exceeds specific turnover threshold in terms of 
global and European sales.5  
                                                
2 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/overview_en.html, 2014-01-27. 
3 ibid. 
4 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings.  
5 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/overview_en.html, 2014-01-30. 
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Until quite recently and for a long time, the procedural course of action and 
the scope of the Merger Regulation has remained the same. As a result one 
can ask why such a dynamic area of business is governed by a rather static 
set of rules – giving rise to “enforcement gaps”? 
 
Clearly, I was not the first person to identify an enforcement gap why the 
Commission, as late as in June 2013, released a staff working document 
titled; “Towards more effective EU merger control”6 (hereinafter referred to 
as the “consultation paper”), introducing several options on how to plug a 
perceived gap relating to acquisitions of (non-controlling) minority 
shareholdings. The consultation paper aimed at bringing light upon and 
propose amendments to i) extending the scope of the EU Merger Regulation 
to the acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholdings and ii) 
reforming the referral system between the Commission and NCAs (the 
enforcement gaps). The former will be examined in this paper. The 
consultation paper was followed by a consultation period, ending in 
September 2013, during which various stakeholders had the opportunity to 
submit their responses on possible improvements of the Merger Regulation. 
In January 2014 a new implementing Merger Regulation entered into force 
containing amended provisions with regards to the simplification of the 
referral procedures but lacking provisions providing the Commission the 
power to intervene and investigate creations of structural links.  
 
Due to the lack of self-standing provisions governing structural links in the 
final outcome, this thesis seeks to bring light upon and examine the possible 
impacts for businesses if the Commission were to introduce a system by 
which it would have the possibility to scrutinise, and if appropriate, reject 
certain acquisitions of (non-controlling) minority shareholdings.  
 
 
- “A Limited Reform – But with Significant Consequences”7 
 
1.2 Aim and purpose 
Over the last years, the Commission and concerned stakeholders have 
heavily discussed the possible effects of implementing a revised Merger 
Regulation. As a product of the discussions the final outcome of the initial 
consultation paper is rather different from what was first proposed by the 
Commission.  
 
The broad aim and purpose of this thesis is to provide a complete picture of 
the recent discussions with regards to the introduction of a new legal toolkit 
providing the Commission the power to control certain creations of 
structural links.  
                                                
6 Commission Staff Working Document, “Towards more effective EU merger control”, 
SWD(2013) 236 final. 
7 Steptoe & Johnson LLP, ”Upcoming reforms in EU merger Control”, European Union, 
February 14 2013. 
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However, to give an exhaustive report of the broader aim is a desirable but 
unrealistic thought, given the scope of the paper. Therefore, this study will 
be limited to focus on when and if the acquisition of (non-controlling) 
minority shareholdings is to be implemented as a form of merger regulation 
intervention and if this will create a more business-friendly Union. This will 
be achieved by investigating how the introduction (if any) of a new merger 
control system will affect companies in terms of undue burdens, costs and 
legal certainty. Thus, this thesis aims to examine, the possible consequences 
for businesses. Introducing a discussion of: “what is to come-character” 
will, by its very nature, boil down to which system, if any, is the most 
beneficial for companies? By establishing this line of discussion, the author 
hopes that the thesis will serve as a basis for future research.    
 
Accordingly, this thesis seeks to primarily address the following research 
question: 
 
• What will be the consequences in terms of undue burdens, costs 
and legal certainty for businesses if the Commission were to 
confer jurisdictional power to intervene, investigate and, if 
appropriate, reject an acquisition of (non-controlling) minority 
shareholdings?  
  
o Which system, if any, is the most beneficial for businesses? 
 
The specified research question will mainly be examined from a business 
point of view (so is the nature of the question), yet observe the diverse 
perspectives of the Commission and a selection of stakeholders.   
 
1.3 Method and material 
As a first source for performing the purpose of the paper, legal dogmatic 
method will be used. This method gives expression for sources of law such 
as legislation, doctrine and case law which together will work as a toolkit to 
describe the historical development, current legal framework (“de lege 
lata”) and certain central concepts such as legal certainty, i.e. chapter two, 
four and to some extent chapter five. Since the thesis in itself will examine 
the implications of a EU regulation, construed in the light of Articles 101 
and 102 of the TFEU8, both primary- and secondary EU law and in 
particular official documents from the EU will work as a predominant 
source of material throughout the thesis.  
 
Chapter three aims to describe the incentives and background of the 
consultation paper, the current practise and the proposed options/systems 
and the responses thereof. This will mainly be achieved by using a 
descriptive method stemming from various sources such as official 
documents, publications and responses but also credible online sources.  
                                                
8 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official 
Journal of the European Union C 83/47 of 30.3.2010. 
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The main reason for using a descriptive method based on official 
documentation rather than a traditional legal dogmatic method lies in the 
fact that the content of the chapter in itself describes an issue not yet 
discussed in neither law or doctrine nor case law and which consequences 
are yet to be seen.9 The author is aware that the submitted responses 
originating from e.g. NCAs, law firms or companies may be biased. Thus, 
such responses will work as an indicator of the position taken by 
stakeholders rather than a statement of law.  
 
Sub-headings titled “chapter summary” and chapter six will present results 
of the findings and consequently analyses thereof and will solely be based 
on what have previously been discussed with the exemptions of conclusions 
made by the author, thus a more analytic approach will be used.   
 
In addition to the abovementioned methods and sources, a law and politics 
approach has been applied. The reason hereof is because the research 
questions “demand” such an approach to satisfy the purpose of the thesis as 
the law and politics perspective involves a broader analysis of the rationale 
behind the differences. Accordingly, such an approach will give the author 
greater possibilities to elaborate the conclusions and make tentative 
suggestions with regards to the research question.  
 
Finally a law and economic perspective has been used as the purpose of the 
thesis is, inter alia, to examine whether the proposed merger reform will 
create a more business-friendly Union, in terms of both undue burdens and 
economic effects of the law. By doing so the author will be able to analyse 
the result from an economic point of view taking into consideration most 
companies’ primary interest, profit.  
 
Throughout the composition of this thesis evaluation of the sources used has 
been done continuously. In parts where legal dogmatic method is used this 
has not been an issue since such sources must be seen as independent and 
unbiased. However, when using information deriving from more uncertain 
sources (essentially in parts dealing with individual opinions) it has been 
deemed necessary to use a more critical approach.  
1.4 Scope and delimitations 
Several limitations need to be acknowledged to be able to provide a 
satisfactory conclusion to the specified question. European merger control is 
by definition a broad area covering various aspects of economic, political 
and legal nature. Hence, limitations have to be made in relation to the 
studied topic.  
 
                                                
9 Electronic answer from the Commission dated 2014-01-27: “There are no court cases 
pending before the courts in which the procedures were based on the Amended 
Implementing Regulation. All cases being reviewed by our services, as of post 1 January 
2014, should, in principle, be notified using the new forms – as the merger simplification 
package became applicable as of 1 January 2014”. 
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As a starting point this thesis will solely focus on the European Merger 
Regulation albeit references will be made to the Member States governance 
of mergers and acquisitions. However, such references will primarily work 
as explanatory comparisons and as a tool to be able to describe and/or 
exemplify whether domestic systems could be applicable also in the 
Commission’s line of work. 
 
The Merger Regulation contains a considerable amount of legal and 
regulatory provisions. Given the latest developments in the sector 
limitations with regards to the two proposed amendments seem reasonable. 
Thus, this thesis will solely focus on the possibility to extend the scope of 
the EU Merger Regulation to the acquisition of non-controlling minority 
shareholdings and consequently on segments10 in the Merger Regulation 
that are associated to the proposed amendment. Having said that it is 
implied that e.g. fundamental aspects such as the rationale behind abusive 
dominant behaviour or exhaustive examination of Article 101 and 102 of the 
TFEU will fall outside the scope of this paper. That is, even if such 
behaviour or the implications of Articles 101 and/or 102 may be the 
justification for the Commission to initiate further investigation under the 
procedural rules.  
 
Without ignoring the importance of considering the research question in an 
objective manner, the scope of this thesis will mainly examine the results 
from a business point of view. This means that the effectiveness and 
competitiveness of the Union will merely be scrutinised in terms of the 
attractiveness for businesses to e.g. invest within the internal market. 
Moreover, to meet the objective of studying the research question from a 
business point of view, it has been deemed necessary to limit the number of 
responses referred to in this paper. Each and every response referred to is 
therefore judiciously selected by the author (in the light of Annex B and C) 
and in a way that the author considers to be the best suitable to fulfil the 
purpose of the paper.  
 
Moreover the author finds it essential to reflect the allocation of 
jurisdictional competence between the Commission and the Member States, 
as this will create an opportunity to assess whether the studied question is 
beneficial or detrimental for companies involved in a proposed merger or 
acquisition. The reason behind this approach is because an important 
element of a potential merger or acquisition may depend on, who is the 
responsible authority and what is that authority’s competence, the notion of 
legal certainty, i.e. chapter five. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 E.g. Articles 4(4) and 4(5), 9 and 22 of the 139/2004 Merger Regulation, covering the 
pre- and post notification system and associated thresholds.  
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Furthermore, it is worth mentioning the existence of different businesses. 
Whilst some are focusing on profit others are non-profitable (pro bono) 
companies, some are small whilst others are bigger and so on. This thesis 
will only consider companies that have a profitable interest and that is of 
such considerable size11 that a potential merger or acquisition might fall 
under EU legislation. It is per se deemed unnecessary for the purpose of this 
thesis to examine companies that are solely dependent on national 
legislation since the study will exclusively investigate the European legal 
framework on a Union level. However, as a consequence of the fairly 
extensive harmonisation process of merger control during the last decades 
the information provided in this paper will be valuable for the reader also on 
a national level as domestic legislation is construed in the light of EU law 
and thus, to some degree comparable. 
 
Lastly, and even if the Commission from time to time stresses the disparities 
between horizontal and vertical concentrations and creations of joint 
ventures, those concepts will merely be mentioned but not further explained 
as the author trusts that the beneficiaries of this paper are aware of the 
differences. Likewise, the basis of how to calculate thresholds (for 
Community dimension) and apply the SIEC test (substantive appraisal) will 
fall outside the scope as the complexity of these concepts would be 
overwhelming for the purpose of this paper. That same goes for the Zephyr 
Database which is merely mentioned without further explanation.  
 
1.5 Disposition 
This thesis has been divided into six chapters. Following this introductory 
chapter in which the background and various explanatory and technical 
aspects have been covered, the second chapter will give the reader a historic 
overview of the development of EU merger control as a step to further 
understand the underlying reasons why the Commission has opted for 
introducing a new Merger Regulation that cater the globalisation and current 
business environment.  
 
Chapter three will form the most substantive part of this paper, describing 
the consultation paper from several angles starting with a brief background 
and introduction which will provide the reader with a rigid starting point to 
understand the sequent sub headings. Following this introduction, the 
current practise, main objectives and proposed options will be discussed. 
The reader should be aware that the proposal will be examined in terms of, 
what was desired by the Commission and what was later adopted by the 
Commission as the final outcome did not take into consideration the 
acquisition of minority shareholdings. Lastly, chapter three will bring light 
upon a selection of responses from stakeholders as a step to provide the 
reader with independent opinions in regards to what the Commission 
desired to adopt in the first place.  
                                                
11 Companies close to, or above the set thresholds in the Merger Regulation.  
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The desired result of presenting stakeholders responses is to give a clear 
idea why certain measures are not being implemented at this stage and 
consequently serve as the base for the forthcoming chapters which will 
further discuss certain impacts for businesses.  
 
Chapter four will provide the reader with an in-depth analysis of the 
Commission’s decision, the EGC ruling and the OFT and CC judgement in 
the Ryanair v Aer Lingus case. This case has been heavily debated and is of 
utter importance for the discussion of the notion of reviewing acquisitions of 
(non-controlling) minority shareholdings. Consequently the analysis in 
chapter four will provide a hands on exemplification of what has been 
discussed in chapter three providing the reader further understanding of how 
problematic the studied topic could be in reality. 
 
Chapter five and the last chapter which are of a more descriptive character 
will discuss a selection of important consequences and concepts for 
concerned undertakings. The author will mainly discuss the concept of legal 
certainty and possible undue burdens for companies covered by the 
proposed reform. This discussion will lead the reader to the final chapter in 
which final concluding remarks will be presented and summarized. In this 
section the author aims to provide a final understanding and guidance on 
whether the proposed amendments could create a more business-friendly 
Union but also discuss and analyse why the majority of the responding 
stakeholders rejected the proposed amendments. A desirable outcome is also 
to provide recommendations and, if possible, give an idea of what is to 
come. 
 
1.6 Terminology 
As this thesis aims to examine certain developments of the EU merger 
control it is vital to be comfortable with important terms and concepts as 
they change over time.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis the author will use the terms “non-controlling 
minority shareholdings” or “minority shareholdings” and “structural links” 
interchangeably. The definition of these terms are to be understood as 
defined in paragraph 19 of the Commission’s consultation paper Annex I12. 
Similarly, the use of the terms concentration(s), merger(s) and acquisition(s) 
are regularly recurring throughout the paper. These terms are to be 
understood as defined under Article 3 of the EUMR.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
12 Para. 19, Annex I, “Economic Literature on Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings 
(“Structural links”)”, to the Commission Staff Working Document, “Towards more 
effective EU merger control”, SWD (2013) 239 final, Part 2/3. 
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Furthermore, in December 2009 the TFEU entered into force and as a 
consequence the numbering of articles was amended. Therefore, e.g. 
doctrine and case law published prior to 2009 uses Articles 81 and 82. In 
this paper, references will continuously be made to the new Articles 101 and 
102.  
 
Moreover, this thesis will make references to the “European market” which 
is often labelled as the “single market”, “internal market” or, formerly, the 
“common market". In this paper the meaning will be the same and defined 
as:  
 “The internal market of the European Union is a single market in which the 
 free movement of goods, services, capital and persons is ensured and in 
 which European citizens are free to live, work, study and do business.”13 
  
Lastly, when references are made to the “Merger Regulation” the author 
means the “Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on 
the control of concentrations between undertakings.” References made to 
the “Implementing regulation” means the “Commission Regulation (EC) 
No.802/2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004”, and 
references made to the ”New Implementing Regulation” or the “New 
Implementing Merger Regulation” the author means the “Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1269/2013 of 5 December 2013 
amending Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 implementing Council Regulation 
(EC)”. The new implementing regulation may also be referred to as the 
“simplification package”, or “merger reform”. Noteworthy to mention is 
also that references will be made to the 1989 Merger Regulation14, however, 
when this is the case it will clearly be explained by the context.  
 
 
 
                                                
13 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/index_en.htm, 2014-02-06. 
14 Regulation 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 395. 
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2 Important concepts and 
development of EU merger 
control 
2.1 Introduction  
Due to the rapid pace of development, European merger control is one of the 
most complex areas of competition law. As a consequence the legislation 
and its accompanying guidelines are fairly frequently updated in one way or 
another and as a result, companies need to keep up with the current legal 
framework to make sure that actions taken are compatible with EU law.  
 
The strengthening of a position of dominance in terms of “internal 
growth”15 is not prohibited under EU law as it is merely an outcome of a 
company’s own commercial effectiveness and should therefore not be 
punished.  However, if the position of dominance is strengthened as a result 
of “external growth”, that could be, the creation of concentrations of 
previously independent companies, certain competition issues may occur.16 
This is of course only true for concentrations that may distort, or in any 
other way significantly harm or impede the competition within the Union.17 
Hence, the starting point for the legislator should lie in the notion that 
concentrations could generate efficiencies that contribute to a dynamic 
economy by e.g. strengthening and distinguishing the internal market rather 
than harming it.18 Nonetheless, and by contrast with internal growth, 
external growth, as an outcome of the creation of a concentration, may give 
rise to a “bundle of companies” that in turn could benefit from and take 
control over the economic capacities already existing in the market. Once 
such concentrations are realised there is a potential risk that e.g. the post-
merger prices and/or the incitement to innovate is taking the rap as a result 
of that particular merger or acquisition. For this reason, external growth by 
and between companies could potentially damage the competition and thus 
be subject for review under the European merger control laws.19   
 
 
 
 
                                                
15 E.g. the achievement of technological advantage, growth of financial assets or strategic 
advantages through distribution networks. 
16 M. Rosenthal & S. Thomas, ”European Merger Control”, C.H Beck, Hart Publishing, 
2010, p. 1 f.  
17 The precise definition in Article 2(3) EUMR states: ”[concentrations] /.../ would 
significantly impede effective competition in the common market or in a substantial part of 
it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position” 
18 M. Rosenthal & S. Thomas, ”European Merger Control”, C.H Beck, Hart Publishing, 
2010, p. 2. 
19 Ibid. 
 14 
Due to the perception that certain mergers may affect the competitive 
environment to such a degree and in such direction that it might damage the 
effectiveness of the Union there is a substantive legal framework governing 
the issue. Conversely, this has not always been the case, thus a basic 
knowledge about the development of EU merger control is desirable to 
provide greater understanding of the recent developments and in particular 
whether the same set of notification rules shall apply also for structural links 
(primary to maintain the same high level of legal certainty). 
 
2.2 Important legal instruments  
The first preventive provision20 on control of mergers and acquisitions arose 
under the 1952 Treaty establishing the Coal and Steel Community21 
(hereinafter referred to as the ECSC Treaty). The ECSC Treaty provided a 
provision dealing with the control of concentrations. The provision was, 
admittedly limited to concentrations affecting the coal and steel sector but 
was nonetheless a first step towards recognising the complexity of mergers 
and acquisitions that could affect the competition on the internal market. 
Not long after the ECSC was established the 1958 Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community (hereinafter referred to as the EEC Treaty) 
entered into force22. At this time, the notion of controlling concentrations 
was indeed recognised and heavily discussed. Paradoxically the “new” EEC 
Treaty did not include any additional or supplementary provision (save for 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, see below) dealing explicitly with the control 
of concentrations.23 However, after the implementation of the EEC Treaty it 
became clear that the omission of provisions dealing with mergers and 
acquisitions, outside the scope of the coal and steel sector, could be 
problematic. Therefore the CJEU confirmed in its famous Continental Can24 
and British-American Tobacco25 cases that Articles 101 and 102 of the 
TFEU should also apply to certain concentrations.26  
 
 
 
                                                
20 See Article 66(1) of the ECSC stating: ”Any transaction shall require the prior 
authorisation of the High Authority /…/ if it has in itself the direct or indirect effect of 
brining about within the territories referred /.../ a concentration between undertakings /.../ 
whether it is effected by merger, acquisition of shares or parts of the undertaking or assets, 
loan, contract or any other means of control.”. 
21 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and Annexes I-III, Paris, 18 
April 1951. 
22 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community or The Treaty of Rome, 25 
March 1957. 
23 M. Rosenthal & S. Thomas, ”European Merger Control”, C.H Beck, Hart Publishing, 
2010, p. 3. 
24 Case 6-72 Continental Can v. Commission [1973] E.C.R. 215. 
25 Joined Cases 142 and 156/84 British-American Tobacco & R.J. Reynolds v. Commission 
[1987] E.C.R 4487. 
26 M. Rosenthal & S. Thomas, ”European Merger Control”, C.H Beck, Hart Publishing, 
2010, p. 3. 
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Shortly after the CJEU judgment in Continental Can and British-American 
Tobacco it became, once again, evident that Articles 101 and 102 of the 
TFEU were insufficient to effectively control the internal market in which 
concentrations where more and more frequently occurring. Therefore a 
special regime was established to address the complications that 
concentrative transactions may cause to the competitive environment. 
Accordingly, in 1989 a special regulation27 entered into force aiming to 
provide a uniform legal framework for the assessment of concentrations.28 
The regulation was later replaced by the new version of the Merger 
Regulation29, entering into force May 1, 2004 which was, later in 2004, 
amended by the Implementing Regulation30 which, in turn was amended and 
implemented as late as of January 1, 2014 by the New Implementing Merger 
Regulation31. Consequently, the New Implementing Merger Regulation 
comprises amended versions of the Implementing Regulation and its 
accompanying notification and referral annexes, “Form CO” (for standard 
merger notifications), “Short Form CO” (for simplified merger 
notifications) and “Form RS” (for referral requests).32  
 
2.3 Central terminologies in the 139/2004 
Merger Regulation 
2.3.1 Scope  
In accordance with recital 9 of the EUMR the scope of application of the 
Merger Regulation is defined according to the geographical area of the 
activity of the undertakings concerned and is limited to those concentrations 
that exceeds certain quantitative thresholds as defined by the Community 
dimension in Articles 1(2)33 and 1(3) 34 of the EUMR.  
                                                
27 Regulation 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 395, 3. 
12. 1989.  
28 M. Rosenthal & S. Thomas, ”European Merger Control”, C.H Beck, Hart Publishing, 
2010, p. 3 f.  
29 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings. 
30 Commission Regulation (EC) No.802/2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No. 
139/2004 (The "Implementing Regulation"). 
31 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1269/2013 of 5 December 2013 
amending Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC). 
32http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d6737485-87fe-414c-9feb-bc75fb56d2d3, 
2014-02-07. 
33 Article 1(2), EUMR: “A concentration has Community dimension where: a) the 
combined aggregated world-wide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than 
€500 million and b) the aggregated Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the 
undertakings concerned is more than €250 million, unless each of the undertakings 
concerned achieves more than two-thirds o fits aggregate Community-wide turnover within 
one and the same Member State.”. 
34 Article 1(3), EUMR: “A concentration that does not meet the thresholds laid down in 
paragraph 2 [see footnote 36] has a Community dimension where: (a) the combined 
aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 2 500 
million; (b) in each of at least three Member States, the combined aggregate turnover of all 
the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 100 million; (c) in each of at least three 
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Put simply, Articles 1(2) and 1(3) can be described as the “primary turnover 
thresholds” and the “alternative turnover thresholds”. If a transaction does 
not meet the primary thresholds, the test in Article 1(3) is applied. If the 
transaction does not fall under, neither the primary threshold nor the 
alternative threshold, the transaction is recognised as not having Community 
dimension and thus, it is for the Member States to review the proposed 
merger (if subject for review under national legislation). Hence, Article 1(3) 
catches concentrations that do not per se have a Community dimension but, 
nevertheless, may affect cross-border activities and as a consequence thereof 
need to be notified to multiple NCAs.35 As a result of the structure of Article 
1(3), one can argue that its legal content triggers both advantages and 
disadvantages for companies. Advantages in the sense that it spares 
companies from notifying multiple NCAs, disadvantages in the sense that it 
provides the Commission the ability to review the concentration and, if 
considered necessary, start an investigation or declare incompatible with EU 
law, both alternatives very burdensome for concerned undertakings.  
 
2.3.2 The general principle: “One-Stop Shop” 
It is undesirable that the same merger may be subject to investigation under 
different regimes.36 Therefore, the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction 
under Articles 21(2) and 21(3) on reviewing all possible (major) 
concentrations that is active on a cross-border level and which holds a 
Community dimension. If the criteria are met, at least prima facie, the 
Member States will not be able to apply their own national competition 
laws. However, depending on the specific situation at hand, the division of 
jurisdictional competence might fluctuate. Therefore it is of vital importance 
for companies, and for the sake of “legal certainty”, to be comfortable with 
the so-called “one-stop shop” principle37.  
 
According to the scheme of referrals the allocation of jurisdictional 
competence between the Commission and the Member States is somewhat 
modified as provided for in Articles 4(4) and (5) and Article 9 and Article 
22 of the EUMR38 and further clarified in the Commission’s Notice of 
200539 (hereinafter referred to as the 2005 Notice).  
 
                                                                                                                        
Member States included for the purpose of point (b), the aggregate turnover of each of at 
least two of the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 25 million; and (d) the 
aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned 
is more than EUR 100 million, unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more 
than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same 
Member State.”. 
35 M. Rosenthal & S. Thomas, ”European Merger Control”, C.H Beck, Hart Publishing, 
2010, p. 54 f. 
36 P. Craig & G. De Burca, ”Eu Law – text, cases and materials”, 5ed., Oxford University 
Press, 2011, p. 1052. 
37 See further recital 8, EUMR: the so-called ”one-stop shop” principle. 
38 M. Rosenthal & S. Thomas, ”European Merger Control”, C.H Beck, Hart Publishing, 
2010, p. 8 f.  
39 COM Notice on Case-Referral in Respect of Concentrations [2005], OJ C56/2. 
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The single most important principle in the 2005 Notice seems to be the 
rationale underlying the case referral system, defining the Articles as a 
derogation from the general rules which is defined by the application of the 
turnover criteria and determined exclusively by reference based upon 
objectively determinable turnover thresholds.40 This distinction is 
particularly important by way of providing sufficient legal certainty for 
companies. The idea of tolerating certain mergers or acquisitions to be 
exempted, or rather reattributed to the Member States stem from the 
principle of subsidiarity and/or suitability. Thus, depending on the specific 
circumstances, the system offers undertakings the possibility and 
(hopefully) certainty, at an early stage to scrutinise where the ultimate 
jurisdiction lies.41 The articles governing the possibility for the Commission 
to reattribute cases to Member States and vice versa will be further 
discussed below.  
 
2.3.3 Pre-notification reallocation of 
jurisdiction: Article 4(4) and Article 4(5) 
In the 2004 merger reform, Article 4(4) and 4(5) was introduced.42 The 
articles provide concerned parties to a transaction the possibility to, prior to 
the notification of a concentration, inform the Commission by reasoned 
submission, that the concentration may significantly affect competition in a 
market within a Member State that has all the characteristics of a distinct 
market and hence, should be examined in whole or in part, by that particular 
Member State. It is for the Commission to transmit this submission to all 
other Member States which in turn may agree or disagree to the proposed 
concentration. If no Member State disagrees, the Commission may grant the 
Member State the possibility to address national competition law and 
subsequently rule upon the proposed merger or acquisition. In principle and 
according to the 2005 Notice, the jurisdiction should only be reattributed to 
a NCA in circumstances where the latter is more appropriate for dealing 
with the proposed merger or acquisition, taking into consideration the 
competent authority’s tools and expertise.43 Having this in mind, it is 
therefore important for companies to clearly justify why the NCA should 
have the competence to review the concentration by providing well thought-
through arguments and detailed information of the affected market(s). In 
such case, the undertakings desire to make use of the derogations set forth in 
Article 4(4) it is of course vital for the companies to consider the balance 
between the possible beneficial effects of requesting the proposed merger or 
acquisition to be reviewed under national merger regime vis-á-vis the 
potential burdens and additional costs and time consumption such request 
may pose. 
 
                                                
40 Para. 3 and 7, Commission Notice on Case-Referral in Respect of Concentrations [2005], 
OJ C56/2. 
41 COM. Notice on Case-Referral in Respect of Concentrations [2005], OJ C56/2, p. 1 f.  
42 https://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/64572/the-eu-merger-regulation.pdf, 2014-02-
17. 
43 COM. Notice on Case-Referral in Respect of Concentrations [2005], OJ C56/2, p. 9. 
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As a counterpart to the provisions set forth in Article 4(4), Article 4(5) 
allowing undertakings to make use of a mechanism that advocate the 
possibility for companies to be reviewed by the Commission rather than a 
Member State. The main aim of the provision is to provide an alternative 
option for companies to be reviewed by the Commission as long as the 
following criteria’s are met: the parties to the transaction i) constitutes a 
concentration within the meaning of Article 3 ii) do not have Community 
dimension as defined by Article 1 iii) are subject for review under national 
competition laws of at least three Member States. The submission by a 
concentration to be reviewed by the Commission can be made before any 
NCA and as long as no other Member State disagree. If no Member State 
disagrees, the proposed concentration shall be deemed to have Community 
dimension and consequently be subject for review by the Commission. If so 
is the case, no Member States may apply its national law to the 
concentration.44  Making use of this mechanism may decrease the burdens 
for companies functioning on a cross-border level planning to merge or 
acquire, as the Commission’s decision to declare (assumption) the 
concentration compatible with EU law will be fully effective throughout the 
Union.  
 
2.3.4 Post-notification reallocation of 
jurisdiction: Article 9 and 22 
When the Merger Regulation was drafted in the late 1980s the Member 
States, and in particular Germany, was concerned that a number of mergers 
and acquisitions may not be harmful from a EU perspective, even if holding 
Community dimension, but could still be detrimental at national level. 
Accordingly, Article 9 of the EUMR, known as the “German clause”, was 
adopted to provide the Member States the possibility to request that a 
concentration notified to the Commission ought to be reattributed to the 
competent NCA, proviso that the conditions set out in Article 9(2)45 are 
met.46  Even if Article 9(3) states that it is for the Commission to decide 
whether the proposed merger or acquisition threatens to affect a distinct 
(national) market it is a clear statement that the jurisdictional competence 
may transfer as a result of the characteristics of a certain concentration. 
Initially, the Commission rejected most cases where Article 9 was used.  
However, after the Streetley plc v Tarmac case47 in 1992 in which the 
Commission accepted the use of Article 9 by request of the United 
Kingdom, the provision have been used to a greater extent.48  
                                                
44 P. Craig & G. De Burca, ”Eu Law – text, cases and materials”, 5ed., Oxford University 
Press, 2011, p. 1054. 
45 Article 9(2) set the following conditions: [when a concentration] /.../ (a) threatens to 
affect significantly competition in a market within that Member State which presents all the 
characteristics of a distinct market or (b) affects competition in a market within that 
Member State which presents all the characteristics of a distinct market and does not 
constitute a substantial part of the internal market. 
46 P. Craig & G. De Burca, ”Eu Law – text, cases and materials”, 5ed., Oxford University 
Press, 2011, p. 1053. 
47 Case IV/M180 Streetley plc v Tarmac [1992] 4 CMLR 343. 
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Equally, other (smaller) Member States, and in particular the Netherlands, 
argued that mergers and acquisitions which do not hold Community 
dimension shall still be able to be referred to the Commission from the 
Member States. The reason hereof lies in the fact that some Member States, 
especially in 1989, lacked their own merger control schemes and could 
therefore not examine the potential concentration in a satisfying way.49 As a 
consequence, Article 22, know as the “Dutch clause”, was introduced to 
provide NCAs, a Member State or joint States, the possibility to refer 
concentrations as defined in Article 3, not holding Community dimension 
within the meaning of Article 1 to be investigated by the Commission where 
it affects trade between Member States and threaten to significantly affect 
competition within the territory of the Member State or States making the 
request. It is for the Commission to decide whether a concentration meet the 
criteria’s set out in Article 22(3) and also to decide whether to take action or 
not.50  Whilst the use of Article 9 has increased in importance over the 
years, Article 22 is nowadays rarely used as a result that most Member 
States now have their own merger control regime. However, both played a 
central role in the discussions which led to the 2004 Merger Regulation and 
still plays an important role in the notion of allocation of jurisdictional 
competence between the Commission and the Member States and thus, 
affect legal certainty and actions taken by companies, let it be the realisation 
of full mergers or the creation of structural links, the referral system is of 
vital importance.51  
2.4 Chapter summary 
It goes without saying that the EU merger control has considerably 
developed since the establishment of the Coal and Steel Community, 
predominantly, as a result of the rapid globalisation. It is noteworthy to say 
that, even as early as in 1952, the Community “realised” the importance of 
controlling mergers and acquisitions as the creation of a concentration may 
impede competition. However, it was not until as late as in 1989 that a 
special regime was established to directly address situations of concentrative 
transactions that could be harmful for the internal market.  The 
establishment later led to the creation of the 1989 Merger Regulation. The 
1989 Merger Regulation introduced special provisions aiming at controlling 
jurisdictional matters under certain circumstances. As years went by, the 
Commission identified its “first” enforcement gap which subsequently led to 
the 2004 Merger Regulation. By introducing additional provisions of 
jurisdictional nature the Commissions manage to plug this gap. Now, ten 
years later, the Commission has identified its “second” enforcement gap – 
(non-controlling) minority shareholdings.  
                                                                                                                        
48 A complete list of ”Article 9” full referral cases can be found here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result, 2014-02-18.  
49 M.P. Broberg, ”The European Commission’s Jurisdiction to Scrutinise Mergers”, 2nd 
ed., Kluwer Law International, 2003, p. 8 f. 
50 P. Craig & G. De Burca, ”Eu Law – text, cases and materials”, 5ed., Oxford University 
Press, 2011, p. 1054. 
51 M.P. Broberg, ”The European Commission’s Jurisdiction to Scrutinise Mergers”, 2nd 
ed., Kluwer Law International, 2003, p. 10. 
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As is fairly evident from all the abovementioned it is only under rather 
specific circumstances that reattribution of jurisdictional competence occurs. 
The derogations from the general one-stop shop principle, which provides 
the Commission the sole jurisdictional competence of reviewing all 
concentrations by definition of Article 3, seems to merely provide the 
Member States and/or undertakings theoretical possibilities to refer potential 
concentrations, but which in reality rarely happens. Looking at Slaughter 
and May’s publication on “The EU Merger Regulation – An overview of the 
European merger control rules” from March 2012, support this impression: 
 
 The total number of notifications to the Commission from 1990 – 2011 is 
 4857. Out of those, 245 (or roughly 5%) of the referrals is made from the 
 Member States/NCAs or undertakings to the Commission of which 217 (or 
 roughly 4,5% of the 5%) under the pre-notification provision in Article 
 4(5) whilst 144 (or roughly 3%) of the referrals are made from the 
 Commission to the Member States of which the pre-notification provision 
 under Article 4(4) seems to be the most frequently occurring since its 
 introduction in  2004.52  
 
Bearing in mind that the Commission is given the sole jurisdictional 
competence to review major concentrations and that the case referral system 
is not very frequently used, it is indeed interesting that the consultation 
paper is labelled as creating a more business-friendly Union, yet introducing 
new systems providing the Commission additional power to also review 
acquisitions of non-controlling minority shareholdings. Even if the options 
provided for in the consultation paper did not became reality when the New 
Implementing Merger Regulation was adopted in 2014, one can argue that 
the proposed options establishes a clear-cut message of the Commission’s 
ambition to create a legal toolkit whereby it will “benefit” from additional 
power, providing it the possibility to review creations of structural links 
where the change of control may be considerably less than 50%53.   
 
 
                                                
52 https://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/64572/the-eu-merger-regulation.pdf, annex 2 
p. 38, 2014-02-18. 
53 The reader should note that there is no fixed percentage in law of what is considered to 
be “control” or “joint control”. Thus, the control of a concentration needs to be assessed on 
a case-by-case basis in which less than 50% have been considered to constitute a 
concentration within the meaning of the Merger Regulation, the notion of “decisive 
influence”. See chapter 3.2.1 for more information.  
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3 “Towards a more effective EU 
merger control” 
3.1 Introduction and background  
On 20 June 2013, the Commission published its consultation paper 
“Towards more effective EU merger control” which primary objectives was 
to assess the possibilities of:  
 
• extending the scope of the EU Merger Regulation to the 
acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholdings. The paper 
propose several options to achieve effective control of non-
controlling minority shareholdings and /…/; 
 
• reforming the referral system between the Commission and 
national competition authorities, making it more business-friendly 
by streamlining and shortening procedures but without 
fundamentally changing the system's basic features.54 
 
The consultation period closed on 12 September 2013.  
 
In its consultation paper, the Commission stress the importance of regularly 
reviewing and improving the merger system to meet the evolving practice 
and enhances that: “nearly 10 years after the most recent reform,55 is an 
appropriate time to reflect the possibility of improvements due to the rapid 
pace of business development and globalisation.”56 According to the 
“International Comparative Legal Guide to: Merger Control 2014”; the 
previous major reform57 primarily focused on plugging a perceived 
enforcement gap triggered by the existing set of rules which governed the 
Commission’s possibility of reviewing mergers but was limited to the 
creation of strengthening a dominant position. Now, 10 years later, it seems 
that the Commission has identified another enforcement gap directly 
relating to the possibility of reviewing minority shareholdings. The main 
concern is that certain business formations escapes prior review by the 
Commission under the current Merger Regulation.  
 
                                                
54 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2013_merger_control/index_en.html, 2014-
02-10. 
55 The Merger Regulation was first adopted as Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 
December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ L 395, 
30.12.1989, p. 1). Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 was later amended by Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1310/97 of 30 June 1997 (OJ L 180, 9.7.1997, p. 1). The re-casting of 
the Merger Regulation in 2004 led to the adoption of Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004, the current Merger Regulation.  
56 Commission Working Staff Document, “Towards more effective EU merger control”, 
SWD (2013) 236 final, p. 3. 
57 See further under 2.4. 
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Heretofore, the Commission’s powers has been limited to the acquisition of 
control in a company, which implies that the Commission can only review 
the acquisition of a company’s shares if the acquirer confers de facto control 
of the target company. After recent events (see e.g. “Ryanair v Air Lingus” 
below), the Commission has established that certain situations require an 
effective set of tools to prevent anti-competitive behaviour which do not per 
se give expression of acquiring joint or sole control. 58 
 
Whilst the Commission appears to perceive the new reform primarily as a 
tool to create a more business-friendly, effective and competitive Union, 
others consider the proposal, and in particular the possibility to extend the 
scope to acquisitions of NCMS, merely as an instrument providing the 
Commission additional power to intervene in pure business transactions 
which consequently counteract the Commission’s own intentions.  
 
This chapter will further discuss the Commission’s consultation paper and 
associated questions59, the concerns and rationale behind the enforcement 
gap, i.e. the review of structural links and the responses and consequences 
thereof, as a step to create greater understanding of the proposal and the 
views taken among stakeholders.    
 
3.2 The control for the acquisition of non-
controlling minority shareholdings 
According to section II of the Commission’s consultation paper, effective 
competition policy need appropriate means to warrant a healthy and 
effective internal market. Accordingly, the Commission has identified, what 
they consider to constitute an enforcement gap or absence of provisions 
aiming at preventing anti-competitive effects stemming from an 
undertaking’s intent to acquire minority shareholdings in another 
establishment. As a solution, the Commission has recognised a number of 
options which provides it the necessary legal toolkit to intervene in what it 
deems to be “problematic cases” of structural links and in particular those 
that strike between competitors.60  
 
3.2.1 Notion of “control” and current EU 
practice 
Before examining the objectives and options of the proposal one should bear 
in mind that the Commission, during the last decades, has adopted an 
expansive view of the scope of the concept “control” by which it asserts 
that control could also cover the acquiring of minority shareholdings.  
                                                
58 F. Depoortere & G. Motta, ” International Comparative Legal Guide to: Merger Control 
2014”, 10th ed., Global Legal Group, Chapter 2. 
59 See Annex A. 
60 Commission Working Staff Document, “Towards more effective EU merger control”, 
SWD (2013) 236 final, p. 3. 
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This conception is instructively exemplified in the  “International 
Comparative Legal Guide to: Merger Control 2014” in which the authors 
states that: 
 
 “A firm owning less than 50% of the voting securities of Company A 
 could still be considered to have or obtain control, for example, if it 
 has the power to nominate the majority of Company A's Board of 
 Directors, if de facto the minority stake would represent a stable 
 majority at Company A's shareholders' meetings because of the 
 fragmented nature of the remainder of the shareholdings or if 
 Company A's by laws or any contractual arrangements would give 
 the minority shareholder a decisive influence over Company A, i.e., 
 by giving the minority shareholder the power to decide on or veto 
 strategic commercial decisions relating to Company A.”61  
 
This is indeed an interesting perception of the concept of control, as it 
appears that the Commission creates a wider discretionary interpretation 
than what seems to be the legislator’s intent from the beginning. This 
positioning was confirmed in the Arjomari-Prioux v WTA62 case from 1990. 
 
In Arjomari-Prioux v WTA, Arjomari was found to be able to exercise 
decisive influence on WTA with “only” a 39% stake where the reminder of 
the WTA’s shares were widely dispersed, held by about 107 000 other 
shareholders, non of them whom owned more than 4%, with only three 
shareholders holding over 3% of the issued share capital. Under the specific 
circumstances, Arjomari was considered to acquire control of the 
undertaking within the meaning of Article 3 of the 1989 Merger Regulation 
and consequently the transaction was considered to constitute a 
concentration. Even if the concentration in the end was declared compatible 
with the internal market (it did not have Community dimension), the 
Commission clearly pointed out that acquiring minority shareholdings may, 
under certain circumstances, be enough to constitute a de facto 
concentration and hence the Commission shall have jurisdictional 
competence to intervene. Recently, a to some extent similar situation has 
been pending before the Commission and the EGC in the Ryanair v Aer 
Lingus case63 which is, among other sources, cited in the Commission’s 
consultation paper as a key driver for creating a customised set of rules for 
the notification of NCMS.64  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
61 F. Depoortere & G. Motta, ” International Comparative Legal Guide to: Merger Control 
2014”, 10th ed., Global Legal Group, Chapter 2, I.A., para 3.  
62 Case IV/M.0025, Arjomari-Prioux SA / Wiggins Teape Appleton plc. 
63 Case T-411/07 Aer Lingus v Commission [2010] ECR II-3691. 
64http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2013_merger_control/cadwalader_en.pdf, p. 
3, 2014-02-12. 
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Correctly gasping the definition of control is essential as altering the Merger 
Regulation to further cover structural links necessitates a rethinking of the 
perception of the traditional notion of control. Vital information pertaining 
to the concept of control is to be found in the Commission’s Consolidated 
Jurisdictional Notice65 (hereinafter referred to as the “Jurisdictional 
Notice”), which is construed on the definitions embedded in the Merger 
Regulation.66 Article 3(2) of the EUMR provides a non-exhaustive list of 
means establishing control, namely by rights, contracts or any other means 
and is further explained in Article 16 of the Jurisdictional Notice which 
provides that a concentration may occur on a de jure or de facto basis and 
may take the form of sole or joint control, and extend to the whole or parts 
of one or more undertakings. For a transaction to fall under the current 
merger practice one or the other party should confer the possibility of 
exercising decisive influence over the behaviour in the other undertaking. 
According to Article 16 of the Jurisdictional Notice it is however not 
necessary to show that decisive influence is or will be actually exercised.67 
Accordingly, the notion of decisive influence as an essential feature of 
control does not necessarily entail obtaining sole or joint control but is 
rather interpreted in terms of attaining positive rights such as the operational 
control of the target company.68  
 
That same notion of the concept of control may apply on the acquisition of 
(non-controlling) minority shareholdings. For example Article 57 of the 
Jurisdictional Notice provides that: 
 
 “Even in the case of a minority shareholding, sole control may 
 occur on a legal basis in situations where specific rights are 
 attached to this shareholding. These may be preferential shares to 
 which special rights are attached enabling the minority shareholder 
 to determine the strategic commercial behaviour of the target 
 company, such as the power to appoint more than half of the 
 members of the supervisory board or the administrative board. Sole 
 control can also be exercised by a minority shareholder who has the 
 right to manage the activities of the company and to determine its 
 business policy on the basis of the organisational structure /…/” 
 
The same goes for negative rights (of control) which is provided for under 
Article 56 of the Jurisdictional Notice and aiming at situations whereby a 
party to a transaction acquiring minority shareholdings, providing them the 
possibility of vetoing or blocking important business strategy decisions 
(deadlock situations), may be covered under the current merger regime.  
 
                                                
65 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 2008/C 95/01. 
66 C. S. Rusu, ”Eu Merger Control and Acquisitions of (Non-Controlling) Minority 
Shareholdings – The State of Play”, CLaSF WP Series No. 10, February 2014, p. 2f.  
67 See e.g. Case IV/M.330 ”McCormick/CPC/Rabobak/Ostmann where the Commission 
concluded that the concentration threatens to create a dominant position as a result of which 
competition would be significantly impeded on a distinct German market even if the parties 
did not actually showed the existence of decisive influence. 
68 C. S. Rusu, ”Eu Merger Control and Acquisitions of (Non-Controlling) Minority 
Shareholdings – The State of Play”, CLaSF WP Series No. 10, February 2014, p. 3f. 
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Minority shareholdings may also be deemed to have sole control on a de 
facto basis. This is the case where the shareholder is highly likely to achieve 
a majority at the shareholders' meetings, given the level of its shareholding 
and the evidence resulting from the presence of shareholders in the 
shareholders' meetings in previous years69 (dispersed nature of the 
remaining shareholdings).70 
 
Keeping in mind the above information it is easy to see that control may be 
exercised even where the acquiring party obtain less than 50% of the target 
undertaking. In other words, there is no prescribed minimum stated in law 
what constitutes control but is rather a question for the Commission to 
assess on a case-by-case basis the significance of decisive influence.  
 
As things stands under current EU merger practice the Commission does not 
have the possibility to investigate the creation of structural links unless the 
acquiring party have decisive influence attached to the proposed transaction 
that goes beyond what would normally be expected, i.e. the minority 
shareholder is able to determine the strategic commercial practice of the 
target company.71 According to the Commission, the existence of 
concentrative (minority shareholdings) transactions that do not fall within 
the ambit of the current set of merger rules could however, still raise 
competitive concerns. Thus, it seems that the Commission deems the current 
legal framework to be obsolete in relation to the present European business 
environment. As will be discussed below, the Commission does have, in 
addition to what have been clarified above, additional legal tools to tackle 
minority shareholdings, namely Article 101 and 102 of TFEU. 
 
Summing up, one can argue that the existing legal toolkit is sufficient given 
the rather low number of cases not caught by it. However, this is not the 
Commission’s point of view. 
3.2.2 Objectives of the Commission’s options 
of controlling NCMS 
From the Commission’s point of view, harm to competition and consumers 
can occur, not only from acquiring control, but also from the creation of 
structural links. Even if the Commission stresses that the impacts of anti-
competitive behaviour, as a consequence of the creation of structural links, 
is likely to be less pronounced than de facto acquisition of control, such 
behaviour might still lead to impediment to effective competition in terms of 
e.g. less innovation, less growth and higher prices for consumers.  
                                                
69 Article 59 of the Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 
2008/C 95/01. See also Case IV/M.343 “Société Générale de Belgiqu v. Générale de 
Banque. 
70 C. S. Rusu, ”Eu Merger Control and Acquisitions of (Non-Controlling) Minority 
Shareholdings – The State of Play”, CLaSF WP Series No. 10, February 2014, p. 4. 
71 Ibid. p. 5. 
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The Commission underpins its objectives by two main sources based on 
Annex I72 (economic theory) and on the basis of examples, Annex II73 (e.g. 
examples from the Zephyr Database74 on transactions resulting in change of 
ownership in listed companies and case law) as a step to demonstrate the 
practical impact the acquiring of minority shareholdings may pose on the 
internal market.75  
 
The Commission’s single most important argument to underpin the 
necessity and the degree of seriousness the lack of self-standing provisions 
governing structural links may cause seems to stem from economic theory 
(combined with the Ryanair v Aer Lingus case). According to Annex I, the 
economic effects of acquiring minority shareholdings depends on the 
underlying reasons for the particular transaction. Such reasons could in turn 
be divided into two types of elements, namely: i) the financial interest 
flowing from an acquisition and ii) the corporate rights conferred by an 
acquisition. The financial interest refers to the acquirer’s entitlement to 
shares in the target company whilst the corporate rights refer to the 
acquirer’s right to influence competitive decisions such as price, output and 
product selection. The elements could create incentives for companies 
acquiring financial interests in a competing target company to compete less 
aggressively by e.g. increase its own prices whilst an acquisition of 
significant influence, by means of corporate rights, may create incentives for 
the acquirer to raise the target company’s prices. According to the economic 
literature there are certain scenarios, encompassing the acquisition of control 
and decisive influence, that escapes the current EU merger control even if 
the holder of NCMS may still be able to exercise material influence over the 
target company which potentially may give rise to anti-competitive 
effects.76 Similar conclusions, based on advanced economic theory, where 
drawn in the 2009 OECD report on minority shareholdings and interlocking 
directorates.77 The report contains an exhaustive analysis of possible anti-
competitive effects that might be triggered by creation of structural links 
(from a competition law perspective). In paragraph 47 of the consultation 
paper, the Commission quotes the OECD report to underpin the necessity of 
improving current EU merger control.   
                                                
72 Annex I, “Economic Literature on Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings (“Structural 
links”)”, to the Commission Staff Working Document, “Towards more effective EU 
merger control”, SWD (2013) 239 final, Part 2/3. 
73 Annex II, “Non-controlling minority shareholdings and EU merger control”, to the 
Commission Staff Working Document, ”Towards more effective EU merger Control”, 
SWD (2013) 239 final, Part 3/3. 
74 See para. 91-105, Annex II, “Non-controlling minority shareholdings and EU merger 
control”, to the Commission Staff Working Document, ”Towards more effective EU 
merger Control”. 
75 Commission Working Staff Document, “Towards more effective EU merger control”, 
SWD (2013) 236 final, p. 4. 
76 Annex II, “Non-controlling minority shareholdings and EU merger control”, to the 
Commission Staff Working Document, ”Towards more effective EU merger Control”, 
SWD (2013) 239 final, Part 3/3, p.3.  
77 OECD, ”Antitrust issues involving minority shareholdings and interlocking 
directorates”, DAF/COMP(2008) 30, 2009. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/41774055.pdf . 
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It could be reasonably contended that, by falling back on the OECD report, 
the Commission is seeking to present an idea of global acceptance of the 
existence of the phenomenon as a way to further support its position.     
 
Considering the Commission’s rather convincing position towards 
introducing an additional set of rules, it is noteworthy to stress that the 
Commission, under current merger legislation, already has the possibility to 
scrutinise structural links under most circumstances (see above under 3.2.1). 
Although such scrutiny is limited (the Commission is only allowed to 
review pre-existing structural links) it has occurred in a significant amount 
of cases78. The reason behind the limitation seems to lie in the notion that 
the creation of a structural link, which neither itself change the control in 
another company nor is likely to impede competition. However, where a 
company, previous to a transaction, already holds possession of minority 
shareholdings in its competitor(s) and/or other companies and where such 
minority shareholdings is frequently offered to divest as a step to remedy 
competition concerns there is no legal toolkit available for the Commission 
to intervene.79 The same applies where NCMS has been acquired after 
examination made by the Commission. Therefore, when a subsequent 
acquisition of minority shareholdings does not constitute an acquisition of 
control the Commission is not empowered to interfere. This is so, even if the 
competition concerns would have been exactly the same as if the 
Commission were to review pre-existing minority stakes, a situation that the 
Commission consider to be rather unsatisfactory.80 
 
To this date, there are three Member States that, in its domestic merger 
regimes addresses structural links, namely: Austria, Germany and the 
United Kingdom. The Commission demonstrate the need of expanding the 
scope of the Merger Regulation by highlighting several cases that have been 
pending before the German Bundeskartellamt (The Federal Cartel Office in 
Germany).81  The cases concerns inter alia the energy sector in which the 
acquisition of minority shareholdings in local and municipal electricity 
suppliers by companies in the upstream market was either prohibited or 
conditionally cleared as they were considered to significantly harm the 
competition in Germany.82  
 
                                                
78 See e.g. Case COMP/M.3653 – Siemens/VA Tech, in which Siemens had a minority 
stake in SMS Demang and the Commission found horizontal concerns even if Siemens had 
already announced an option to sell its stake in SMS Demang but which was delayed due to 
a litigation process. Therefore, the Commission found that Siemens, via its minority 
shareholdings, would still have influence on the competitive conduct. The Commission 
approved the merger flowing a commitment by Siemens to transfer its shares in SMS 
Demang as soon as possible. 
79 Annex II, “Non-controlling minority shareholdings and EU merger control”, to the 
Commission Staff Working Document, ”Towards more effective EU merger Control”, 
SWD (2013) 239 final, Part 3/3, p. 4. 
80 Commission Working Staff Document, “Towards more effective EU merger control”, 
SWD (2013) 236 final, p. 5. 
81 See e.g. cases B8-107/02 EWE, E.DIS/Stadtwerke Eberswalde, B8-27/04 
Mainova/Aschaffenburger Versorgungs AG, B8 – 96/08 EnBW / EWE. 
82 Commission Working Staff Document, “Towards more effective EU merger control”, 
SWD (2013) 236 final, p. 5 f.  
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Whilst the Commission makes use of jurisdictional issues by highlighting 
domestic concentration control systems (read Austria, Germany and UK) as 
a step to advocate the necessity of self-standing provisions, others argue that 
the lack of self-standing provisions may also undermine the objective of 
harmonised rule-making as certain minority shareholding transactions may 
be subject for undesirable and unfair scrutiny under a certain regime, e.g. 
the United Kingdom who uses a “material influence” test rather than the 
stricter European “decisive influence” test.83 The position taken by 
Commission officials Joaquin Almunia and Nadia Calvino at the Global 
Competition Review’s Conference in Brussels in September 2010 underpins 
that the Commission supports the idea of greater harmonisation of 
(domestic) merger regimes as it would avoid situations where substantive 
and procedural rules between different domestic systems could lead to 
dissimilar outcomes and thus provide greater legal certainty while 
decreasing burdens and costs for undertakings active on a cross-border 
level.84 The objective of introducing harmonised merger provisions to 
provide greater legal certainty while decreasing burdens and costs for 
companies is indeed interesting as most of the respondents consider the 
proposal to bring the opposite to the table.   
 
Moreover, the Commission emphasises that the possibility to tackle 
minority shareholdings under Article 101 (agreements restricting 
competition) and Article 102 (abuse of dominance) of the TFEU is rather 
limited. Although the CJEU expanded the applicability of Article 101 in 
British-American Tobacco v Commission, it is still unclear whether the 
acquisition of NCMS may constitute an “agreement” within the meaning of 
the Article 10185 and especially in situations where shares are built up in an 
undertaking based on the acquisition of shares traded freely on stock 
exchange.86 The Commission further stress that the use of Article 102 would 
only be applicable under very narrow circumstances as the acquirer of the 
minority shareholdings, at the time of the acquisition, has to hold a 
dominant position which per se exclude the creation of structural links by 
non-dominant companies from the scope of Article 102.87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
83 C. Riis-Madsen, et.al, ”Reform of the EU Merger Regulation: Looking out for the 
Minority”, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, January 2012, p. 3. 
84 . S. Rusu, ”Eu Merger Control and Acquisitions of (Non-Controlling) Minority 
Shareholdings – The State of Play”, CLaSF WP Series No. 10, February 2014, p. 6. 
85 Commission Working Staff Document, “Towards more effective EU merger control”, 
SWD (2013) 236 final, p. 6. 
86 Irish Competition Authority, ”Submission to the European Commision Public 
Consultation: Towards more effective EU merger control”, S/13/04, p. 3. 
87http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f0954d15-52ef-458d-9d0b9e783c83e17d, 
2014-02-19. 
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One can quite easily argue that the EU competition law system is not short 
of tools that may be used when dealing with structural links, yet the 
Commission, or to be more precise, Commissioner Almunia state that the 
existing provisions in the Merger Regulation and the scope of Article 101 
and 102 is not covering all situations of structural links or is to narrow in the 
specific context.88 This same view is also reiterated in the consultation paper 
(including its annexes). Consequently, the Commission appears to call for 
an “update” of the current Merger Regulation by introducing self-standing 
provisions that would directly provides it the possibility to intervene in what 
it considers to be problematic cases of structural links.89 According to the 
Commission, such update would extend the Merger Regulation to not only 
include concentrations defined as: “acquisition of control of another 
company”, but also the “acquisition of minority shareholdings”. Against 
this background, and as a result of satisfying the set objectives of the 
consultation paper, the Commission has proposed several options of how to 
deal with the issue.  
 
3.2.3 Option 1: “The notification system” (ex-
ante review) 
According to Article 2(2) and (3) of the Merger Regulation, the 
Commission must make a prospective appraisal of a concentration’s 
compatibility with the EUMR and on whether the proposed merger would; 
“significantly impede effective competition, in the internal market or in a 
substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position”.90 This appraisal is primary achieved 
by a “substantive test”91, commonly referred to as the SIEC test.    
 
According to the Commission’s consultation paper, and as long as the 
substantive test is applied in the same manner as if the (ex-ante) notified 
merger or acquisition were to assess a concentration holding Community 
dimension as defined in Article 3, a first option of reviewing minority 
shareholdings could simply be to extend the current regulation to also cover 
ex-ante merger control to structural links. Thus, this implies that “all 
relevant” structural links would have to be notified to the Commission in 
advance and subsequently be declared compatible or incompatible with the 
Merger Regulation by the Commission, the idea of “the notification 
system”.92  
 
                                                
88 Joaquin Almunia, SPEECH/12/773. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-12-773_en.htm.  
89 C. S. Rusu, ”Eu Merger Control and Acquisitions of (Non-Controlling) Minority 
Shareholdings – The State of Play”, CLaSF WP Series No. 10, February 2014, p. 9. 
90 Article 2(2) and(3) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on 
the control of concentrations between undertakings. 
91 The rationale behind this method is explained in recital 25 of the EUMR and will not be 
further explained in this paper. 
92 Commission Working Staff Document, “Towards more effective EU merger control”, 
SWD (2013) 236 final, p. 7. 
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The Commission does not define the concept of all relevant structural links 
any further but just imply that such structural links would fall under the 
scope of providing limited information similar to what is the case under the 
“Short Form CO” (see 2.2 above).93  
3.2.4 Option 2: “Self-assessment system” or 
“Transparency system” (discretionary 
review) 
 
The Commission’s second option aims at providing the Commission the 
discretion to select cases of structural links to investigate. Such system 
could, according to the consultation paper either be achieved by a “self-
assessment system”, where the obligation to notify an acquisition of NCMS 
would not be mandatory for the undertakings and so the concerned parties 
would be allowed to proceed with their transaction, but the Commission 
would have the option to ex-offico open an investigation if considered 
appropriate. Under such system the Commission would have to rely on its 
own market intelligence or by complaints to become aware of a possible 
creation of a structural link that may impede the competition on the internal 
market.94 
 
As an alternative to the self-assessment system, the Commission has 
introduced a “transparency system” by which parties involved in the 
creation of structural links ensure that the transaction do not take place 
without notifying the Commission hereof. As it is fairly unlikely that an 
acquisition of NCMS would significantly impede effective competition, the 
Commission emphasises that the concerned parties would merely be obliged 
to file a short information notice.95 In order to create awareness of the 
transaction (transparency) the Commission would have the obligation to 
publish the information for any third party and Member State comments. 
The Commission could then investigate, if appropriate and desirable.96  
 
In addition to both the self-assessment system and the transparency system, 
the Commission opens up for discussion of the possibility for undertakings 
to make voluntarily notifications as well as the possibility to tie the systems 
with so-called “safe harbours”, standstill obligations and certain time limits 
(see comments about this below). 
 
 
 
                                                
93 F. Depoortere & G. Motta, ” International Comparative Legal Guide to: Merger Control 
2014”, 10th ed., Global Legal Group, Chapter 2, I.A., para 9. 
94 Commission Working Staff Document, “Towards more effective EU merger control”, 
SWD (2013) 236 final, p. 7 
95 Containing e.g. information about the parties and the transaction and limited information 
on the sector or markets concerned. 
96 Commission Working Staff Document, “Towards more effective EU merger control”, 
SWD (2013) 236 final, p. 7 
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Lastly the Commission highlights that both systems under the second option 
could be subject for the substantive test (as “full” mergers) and equally fall 
under the Commission’s jurisdiction only if the concerned parties exceeds 
the turnover thresholds as set in Article 1 of the EUMR. 97 By accepting 
such approach, the already established provisions would contribute to 
ensure legal certainty (see further below). 
 
3.2.5 The notion of “problematic cases” of 
structural links 
In the Commission’s consultation paper, the term “problematic cases” is 
frequently recurring without being further defined. Nor is it defined in the 
EUMR and its accompanying documents. Although, one can argue that the 
term does not need further explanation as the Commission acknowledge 
that: 
 “However, as the number of cases creating problematic structural 
 links seems to be rather limited, it may be doubted whether it is 
 necessary to apply all the procedural rules of the current merger 
 regulation to structural links, in particular the mandatory ex-ante 
 notification system, or whether procedural rules can be devised so 
 that the Commission is able to select the problematic cases only.”98 
One can interpret the above as it is solely for the Commission to assess 
whether structural links creates problematic cases on a case-by-case basis. 
However, and since this is not the only option, it seems rather decisive to 
also have an idea of how the term may be perceived by others.  
 
As there is no legal definition (at least not when it comes to structural links) 
one cannot be exactly sure what the Commission means when using the 
term. However, the Bundeskartellamt explains the concept in a rather 
instructive way by which it means that problematic cases are those that 
significantly impedes effective competition and in particular if the merger or 
acquisition is expected to create or strengthen a dominant position. 
However, such cases would most probably fall under current Merger 
Regulation or Article 102, TFEU and so the definition needs further 
investigation.99 Hence, companies that significantly impede effective 
competition might just be those that gain a scope of action to such a degree 
that there is no longer sufficient control of the competition. Accordingly 
they would have the possibility to e.g. increase their price or lower the 
quality of their products or services without risking losing their consumers 
or clients100 or confer the right to board representation or veto right.  Such 
actions may not per se be abuse of dominant position but can also be the 
result of acquiring decisive control in a competitor or other company 
without acquiring a majority post.  
                                                
97 ibid. 
98 Commission Working Staff Document, “Towards more effective EU merger control”, 
SWD (2013) 236 final, p. 6. 
99http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/EN/Mergercontrol/, 2014-02-20. 
100 ibid. 
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Whether such a situation may occur as a result of the creation of structural 
links would most probably need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis by 
the Commission (or else) who then would have to apply the same set of 
rules as if the situation were to cover a full merger. If adopting this approach 
one can elevate the understanding of the rationale behind the concept that 
only creations of structural links that equals full mergers shall be considered 
problematic and consequently be subject for the substantive test and if 
appropriate, investigated by the Commission.101 
3.3 Selection of responses from the 
consultation period 
As mentioned above the New Implementing Merger Regulation102 does not 
include the proposed merger control for structural links. The reason hereof 
seems to lie in the fact that many of the respondents103 opposed the proposal 
as they considered it to rather create disadvantages than advantages, in 
particular with respect to the notion of legal certainty, undue burdens and 
increasing costs that the proposal might procure but also as they consider 
the Commission’s existing legal toolkit sufficient. In the forthcoming a 
selection of responses will be highlighted. 
3.3.1 National competition authorities 
Before examining a selection of responses from NCAs it is indeed 
noteworthy to stress that out of six submissions, three are from Member 
States (Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom), all holding national 
merger legislation governing the creation of structural links, whereas one is 
from Norway (who is not part of the EU but part of the EEA104), yet having 
national legislation covering the issue. The remainder are from Ireland and 
Poland respectively, both Member States that does not have national merger 
legislation governing this area. Hence, to be able to give an objective view 
of the submitted responses, this section will bring light upon the responses 
from Austria (whose national legislation105 governs structural links) and 
Ireland (whose national legislation106 do not governs structural links). This 
sub-heading should be read in the light of Annex A, and in particular 
question 1.  
 
 
                                                
101 See last paragraph in 3.2.4 above. 
102Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1269/2013 of 5 December 2013 
amending Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC). 
103 All responses are available at the Commission’s website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2013_merger_control/index_en.html. 
104 European Economic Area. 
105 E.g. the Cartel Act 2005 (Kartellgesetz) and Competition Act (Wettbewerbsgesetz). 
106 Number 14 of 2002, Competition Act 2002. 
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3.3.1.1 Austria 
According to the Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde107 (hereinafter referred to as 
“BWB”) the current Merger Regulation establish a clear delineation 
between the jurisdictional competence between, on the one hand the 
Commission and on the other the NCAs based on turnover thresholds (one-
stop shop principle), which in turn safeguards legal certainty and creates a 
clear distinction between the Commission’s and NCAs jurisdictional 
competence. As the BWB consider “certainty” and “distinction” well 
incorporated within EU and an important element in the European merger 
control, it explicitly favours a notification system by which it recognises 
that the Commission will have exclusive jurisdiction to scrutinise all 
structural links with Community dimension under current merger legislation 
and under the same conditions as if it was a full merger. This would result in 
safeguarding the clear distinction of the respective jurisdictions and would 
maintain the one-stop shop principle intact as well as avoid situations 
whereby the same structural link could be subject for review by both the 
Commission and NCAs.108 
 
Moreover, the BWB stresses the necessity for Member States to have 
sufficient information to be able to decide upon referral requests if the 
Commission were to introduce any of the selective systems. This is 
especially so, if the selective systems were to include voluntary notification 
as the Member States would have to have the capacity to assess whether 
such notification shall be referred or not. According to BWB both situations 
could be detriment or at least burdensome for smaller authorities, which do 
not, by its very structure, have the capacity to meet such requests and handle 
such amount of information.109 Accordingly, both the self-assessment 
system and the transparency system may pose overwhelming burdens for 
smaller authorities and is therefore excessive to its objectives. 
 
It seems rather clear that the BWB consider the notification system to be a 
suitable solution to meet the set objectives as the system would not create 
any great changes to the current referral system but would merely provide 
the Commission the possibility to investigate acquisitions of NCMS of very 
specific nature, meeting the same criteria’s as other mergers and 
acquisitions.110 The rationale behind its fairly positive attitude towards the 
proposal could be motivated by the very reason that Austria already make 
use of a similar system and therefore, the impacts of the notification system 
would not be very significant.  
 
 
                                                
107 The Austrian Federal Competition Authority. 
108 Dr. T. Thanner, “Public consultation: Towards more effective EU merger control 
HT.3053”, p. 2.  
109 Ibid. p. 2 f.  
110 Ibid. 
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3.3.1.2 Ireland 
If the Austrian submission was rather concise taking a clear standpoint, 
Ireland’s can be considered the opposite. Their nine pages submission 
addresses only the issue of structural links in which the Irish Competition 
Authority (hereinafter referred to as the “TCA”) not only provides answers 
to the raised questions111, but also introduces an alternative proposal.  
 
Contrary to Austria’s merger control system, the TCA set forth in its 
submission that the Irish merger regime as set out in Part 3 of the 
Competition Act 2002112 (as amended in 2012) constitutes a mandatory 
obligation for notification of proposed mergers or acquisitions exceeding 
certain thresholds (as defined in law) with the additional possibility for 
parties involved to notify on a voluntary basis if below the thresholds. 
However, and contrary to the Austrian legal framework, the trigger for 
notification is solely based on change of control, either by transfer or 
acquisition.113 As a consequence, the TCA does not have the authority or 
mandate to address a review or investigation with reference to structural 
links. Thus, the Irish regime only applies if either of the parties acquires 
decisive influence or sole control in the other party (similar to the Merger 
Regulation).114  
 
As a starting point the TCA generally welcomes the proposal as outlined in 
the consultation paper and do indeed agree that there is an enforcement gap 
by which the control of minority shareholdings is not subject for review 
even if the creation of structural links may harm the competition. 
Nonetheless, the TCA identifies two issues, namely:  
 
• Can structural links significantly impede competition? 
• Should the Commission be able to address them with the new 
option?  
 
According to the TCA there is a universally accepted notion that partial 
ownership short of control can impede the competition. The assertion is 
substantiated by examples of legal systems115 that has already recognised 
that partial acquisition can substantially lessen competition.116    
 
With regards to its second concern, the TCA emphasises that it is possible to 
pursue the creation of structural links by using Article 101 or Article 102 of 
the TFEU but enhances that such approach would be consistent with 
difficulties. Nor does Member States (as only three appears to regulate the 
issue) have sufficient means to effectively challenge acquisitions of NCMS 
                                                
111 See Annex A. 
112 Number 14 of 2002, Competition Act 2002. 
113 Section 16 of the Comepeption Act 2002. 
114 Irish Competition Authority, ”Submission to the European Commision Public 
Consultation: Towards more effective EU merger control”, S/13/04, p. 2. 
115 E.g. Austria, Germany, the UK (within EU) and Canada, Japan and the U.S. (outside 
EU). 
116 Irish Competition Authority, ”Submission to the European Commision Public 
Consultation: Towards more effective EU merger control”, S/13/04, p. 3. 
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and, even if the Member States decides to revise its national legislation it 
seems more likely that the creation of problematic structural links would 
affect cross-border transaction and thus be within the jurisdiction of the 
Commission. Accordingly the TCA seems to consider that the Commission 
should be able to address NCMS as long as this is executed in a 
proportionate and balanced manner while minimising the regulatory burden 
on companies and satisfying the need of certainty and transparency.117  
 
The TCA stress that the transparency system is the most suitable to meet the 
set objectives as the notification system, even if the notifiable criterion were 
to be low, e.g. 10% or more demanding, e.g. 30% would, in the former 
presumably result in a very large number of notifications that are not 
problematic (and therefore be burdensome) whilst the latter seems likely to 
create a system by which concerned undertakings may try to escape the 
Commission’s review by actively counteracting the purpose which in turn 
could result in less legal certainty. As a consequence, such system would 
unlikely strike the right balance between burden and benefit.118  
 
Likewise the TCA does not favours the self-assessment system as it 
considers that such system would merely create difficult administrative 
issues that solely relies on the Commission’s market intelligence or third 
party complaints. Accordingly, there is a risk that the Commission’s market 
intelligence will result in reviewing only high profile and/or hostile 
transactions which do not correlate to the actual competition concerns on the 
market as other structural links could also be subject for review. Therefore, 
and in conclusion the TCA favours the transparency system, as this system 
would balance the need for information without significantly increasing the 
regulatory burden on undertakings.119  
 
In addition to the proposed systems the TCA introduces an alternative 
option120 which is a compromise between a pure mandatory system and a 
voluntary system and that has similarities with the self-assessment system. 
According to the TCA, this system would provide the Commission 
sufficient tools to challenge the acquisition of NCMS either by requiring 
parties to a problematic transaction to notify or by relying on voluntary 
notifications. The system would work effectively as long as the Commission 
is obliged to keep track of and gather information about structural links, not 
overly rely on media reports and/or reports from third parties. Furthermore, 
for the system to work the TCA stresses that it would be necessary for the 
Commission to identify all possible cases which would be covered by the 
mandatory requirement (even if such number would be relatively small). 
Such mandatory requirements could consist of e.g. a set percentage of 
shareholdings and/or by the conferring rights such as board membership or 
veto right over strategic decisions.  
 
                                                
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid., p. 4. 
119 Ibid. 
120 The TCA refer this option as the ”self-assessment plus” system. 
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In conclusion the TCA emphasises that this system will most probably offer 
a healthy balance between, on the one hand the possibility to challenge 
problematic cases and, on the other provide legal certainty for undertakings 
under the voluntary option and consequently strike the right balance 
between burden and benefit.121  
 
As for question four to nine (see annex A), the TCA agrees with most of 
what is identified in the consultation paper but highlights the difficulty to 
establish the right level of information that an acquirer should be obliged to 
provide. It should not be too burdensome for undertakings, nor should it be 
as extensive as the current CO form.122 It also stresses that it is essential to 
create a system by which the level of legal certainty remains high.123 
 
As a concluding remark one can argue that, even if the TCA does have the 
possibility to review creations of structural links whereby one of the 
transactional parties confers a decisive influence over the other, they pari 
passu seems to support the general directions taken by the Commission. The 
rationale behind Austria favouring the notification system probably lies in 
the reality that they practice a system similar whilst Ireland lacks such 
system in its regulatory framework. What is certain is that all Member 
States submitting their responses appear to welcome the proposal in one 
way or another, sharing the Commission’s view, that acquisitions of 
minority shareholdings may give rise to anti-competitive behaviour. 
However, other organisations such as law firms and companies seem to 
disagree.  
 
3.3.2 Law firms  
Out of 21 responses from well-established law firms, only three seem to 
consider it directly appropriate to complement the Commission’s toolkit, 
which enables it to investigate creations of structural links under the Merger 
Regulation.124 This is indeed an interesting contrast as all the NCAs 
welcomed the proposal (to a greater or lesser extent). It is of course 
desirable to give a comprehensive review of all responses, however that is 
not feasible given the scope of the paper. Therefore this section will 
introduce the opinions of Baker & McKenzie and Vinge. The reason hereof 
is because their responses are predominantly focusing on the impacts for 
businesses and will therefore instructively mirror the purpose of the research 
question. This sub-heading should be read in the light of Annex B.     
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
121 Irish Competition Authority, ”Submission to the European Commision Public 
Consultation: Towards more effective EU merger control”, S/13/04, p. 6. 
122 Comparable with the BWB’s argumentation (see above under 3.3.1.1). 
123 Ibid. p. 6 f.  
124 See Annex B. 
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As a starting point it is noteworthy to say that most responding law firms 
shared the same view with regards to: 
 
• The self-assessment system is best suitable as it is the less burdensome for 
undertakings, 
• A limitation period is essential to ensure legal certainty for undertakings, 
• The importance of safeguarding the internal market and not create an 
unattractive market for investors, 
• The importance of clear definition of “safe harbours” and “time limits”, 
• Most law firms recognise that there is an enforcement gap, but highlights 
the very narrow practice of structural links.125  
 
3.3.2.1 Baker & McKenzie 
Baker & McKenzie (hereinafter referred to as “McKenzie”) recognises in its 
response126 that, it is only under very limited circumstances that the creation 
of structural links may give rise to competition issues. Thus, it considers a 
wholesale legislative reform to address such limited numbers of cases is a 
highly disproportionate burden for European as well as international 
companies doing business within the internal market and that the proposal 
published by the Commission may potentially create legal uncertainty for 
businesses. Even if the economic theories as outlined in Annex I of the 
consultation paper are well underlined, McKenzie argues that the 
consultation paper features insufficient hard evidence that myriad forms of 
structural links exists within the Union that could result in significant anti-
competitive effects justifying a legislative reform.127  
 
As is also mentioned by the author under 2.4, McKenzie seems to share the 
notion that the proposal appears to fly directly in the face of its intention as 
it is labelled: 
 
"The proposal aims to make EU merger control even more business-
friendly by cutting red tape and streamlining procedures. This initiative is 
part of the Commission's overall effort to make administrative procedures 
less burdensome for business, thereby stimulating growth and making 
Europe more competitive."128 
 
McKenzie underlines that the creation of a system whereby NCMS could be 
subject for investigation by the Commission are likely to impact the health 
of the European economy as there is a perceived risk that financial 
investments, by way of minority shareholdings, will be less commercially 
attractive and so the consultation paper is rather disadvantageous than 
business-friendly for companies.129  
                                                
125 According to the consultation paper only 20 out of approximately 5300 cases would be 
subject for review. 
126 Baker & McKenzie, ”Response to the European Commission’s consultation on the EU 
Merger Regulation in respect of structural links and the referral of merger cases”. 
127 Ibid. p. 1. 
128 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-288_en.htm, 2014-02-27. 
129 Baker & McKenzie, ”Response to the European Commission’s consultation on the EU 
Merger Regulation in respect of structural links and the referral of merger cases”, p. 1 f. 
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Furthermore McKenzie argues that the Commission, under its current 
merger control toolkit, does indeed have the necessary tools to address 
problematic cases of structural links by several legal means. As is clearly set 
out in paragraphs 56-60 of the Jurisdictional Notice, McKenzie notes that, 
structural links that confer control to one or the other party, de jure or de 
facto, is caught by the notice. The same applies also for pre-existing 
structural links as described under 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. As a last resort and if the 
creation of structural links is not caught by the Merger Regulation, the 
Commission has the possibility to take action by relying on Articles 101 or 
102, TFEU.130  
 
Taking into account the abovementioned, McKenzie considers that the 
proposal in respect of structural links should be dropped in its entirety, as it 
would be detrimental for affected undertakings and lessen the incentives to 
invest in the internal market.    
 
3.3.2.2 Vinge 
Vinge does indeed seem sceptical of the new merger reform.  In its response 
it considers the proposed changes as unnecessary, too far-reaching and 
disproportionate to the perceived problem, stating that the Commission’s 
existing antitrust tools are sufficient. Vinge further stresses, as the 
Commission also notices, that the numbers of cases creating problematical 
structural links are rather few. Introducing a general notification 
requirement would therefore be “disproportionately burdensome”. 
Although Vinge notices that the Commission is proposing to introduce a 
system tied to the one-stop shop principle, it does also stresses that most 
Member States do not even review structural links under their national 
merger control regime which in itself underpins that Member States do not 
perceive the situation as problematic as the Commission.131  
 
Similar to McKenzie, Vinge further highlights that the review of structural 
links would not help EU to become more business-friendly as it would 
create less incentives for businesses to invest in the internal market. Even if 
the Commission were to introduce a Short Form (simplified procedures) this 
would still end up being both costly and time consuming for the notifying 
companies, not taking into consideration the effective use of companies’ 
resources. Lastly Vinge emphasises that the objective of the consultation 
paper, i.e. to create a more business-friendly union, under both the on-going 
merger reform and the modernisation of the EU antitrust rules in 2004 is 
contradictory as it will merely provide the Commission additional power to 
investigate companies and thus, not create a more business-friendly 
environment.132   
                                                
130 Ibid. p.3 f.   
131 Vinge, ”Response of Advokatfirman Vinge to the European Commission’s public 
consultation on a proposal towards more effective EU merger control”, 11 September 
2013, p. 1. 
132 ibid. p. 1 f.  
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3.3.3 Companies 
Under the consultation period, six companies, all of them having an annual 
turnover exceeding the thresholds for Community dimension, submitted 
their responses. It is noteworthy to stress that, out of six submissions, three 
originates from airline companies, one in favour (Aer Lingus), one partially 
in favour (Air France) and one firmly against (Ryanair) the proposal. It is 
fair to argue that the reason hereof is because of the extensive judgements in 
the Ryanair v Aer Lingus case.  The remainder are from other globally 
leading companies whom are all, to a greater or lesser extent, against the 
modifications. Therefore, to be able to give a comprehensive idea of the 
businesses standpoint, this section will highlight the responses from Air 
France (semi-pro - under certain circumstances) and Orange133, an industrial 
investor (contra). Both Ryanair and Aer Lingus will be exhaustively 
discussed under chapter 4 and so most of the responded companies will be 
considered in one way or another. This sub-heading should be read in the 
light of Annex C. 
 
3.3.3.1 Air France 
Société Air France (hereinafter referred to as “Air France”) welcomes the 
Commission’s initiative to further investigate the identified enforcement gap 
but only when certain criteria’s are met, namely: 
 
1. “The acquisition of a minority stake does raise serious competition 
concerns;  
2. Anti-trust law is hardly applicable to the operation given the absence of 
agreements entered into between the two companies  
3. Ex-ante control by members states and ex-post review through articles 101 
and 102 TFEU is not efficient nor applicable regarding a specific 
transaction“134 
 
As is evident from the criteria’s only in very limited circumstances will the 
acquisition of NCMS be subject for the Commission’s review under Air 
France’s submission. Air France firmly points out that a systematic and 
mandatory review of minority shareholdings would not be relevant and that 
the result thereof could constitute an impediment for companies to simply 
invest in the internal market even if the investment as such would not give 
rise to any competition issues.  
 
                                                
133 Everything Everywhere Limited (“EE”) is the UK’s largest mobile communications 
provider with nearly 26.8 million customers and mobile subscriber market share of 33%. 
The EE, which operates exclusively in the UK, runs three of Britain’s most famous brands 
– EE (newly established in 2012), Orange and T-Mobile. The EE revenue for the year 2012 
was £6.7 billion. Information from “Everything Everywhere Limited (Comp. no. 2382161) 
Annual Report Group and Company Financial Statements Year ended 31 December 2012”, 
2014-03-03. 
134 Société Air France’s submission, ”European Commission – Consultation on the EU 
Merger Regime Acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholdings ”structural links”, 
12/09/2013, MM/OD.UA, p. 1. 
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If the Commission, even so, decides to add a new tool in order to scrutinise 
structural links, Air France favours the self-assessment system combined 
with the possibility for companies to voluntarily notify a proposed merger or 
acquisition as it considers this solution to be the most manageable for 
companies to comply with. Air France further points out that it is for the 
Commission to decide whether to continue on the set path, stating that the 
system, as it is construed today, may not be deemed appropriate for all 
NCMS but that Merger Regulation intervention could nevertheless be an 
appropriate legal ground for implementing such system. This is so only if 
the structure of the market would significantly change by consequence of 
creations of structural links and where Article 101, TFEU and/or ex-ante 
review is not possible.135  
 
Even if Air France partially welcomes the consultation paper it seems to 
take the view that it is only in very limited cases a new legal toolkit would 
be applicable and that the options presented need further explanation before 
implementation as they are not sufficiently underpinned.  A similar view is 
emphasised by Orange although having more far-reaching doubts. Orange 
introduces four arguments against the proposal in its submission. 
 
3.3.3.2 Orange  
Firstly Orange seems to consider, as many of the law firms, that the existing 
regulatory framework already covers most, if not all, situations of structural 
links, stating that the cases cited in the consultation paper, and in particular 
in Annex II, does not constitute a justified ground for the proposed 
changes.136 
 
Secondly Orange stresses that the changes as such would be 
disproportionate as the cost, burden and realisation of crucial transactions 
for businesses would outweigh the benefits of a new system.137  
 
As a third argument Orange highlights that the proposed amendments would 
be contrary to its aims, inter alia because it would go against the principle 
set out in Article 103 (2)(b) of the TFEU “The regulations or directives 
referred to in paragraph 1 [Articles 101 and 102] shall be designed in 
particular: /…/ to simplify administration to the greatest possible extent”. 
Accordingly, EU competition law should foster competition rather than 
hamper it; something Orange deems the proposal to do. 138  
 
Lastly, Orange emphasises the importance of protecting the internal market, 
taking the view that raising procedural obstacles for transactions may 
discourage the incentives to invest in up-coming businesses or at least make 
                                                
135 Ibid., p. 1-2. 
136 Orange, ”Orange reply to the consultation ”Towards more effective EU merger 
control”, September 2013, p. 1. 
137 Ibid. p. 1 f.  
138 Ibid. p. 2. 
 41 
investors to choose fund companies outside the geographical area of EU 
where they are subject for less procedural obstacles.139  
 
In conclusion, Orange, as well as many of the other responding companies 
(and law firms), argues that the additional burdens that the proposal will 
pose on companies in relation to the very few identified problematic cases 
are disproportionate to the perceived problem.  
3.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter has examined the current EU merger practice, the 
Commission’s consultation paper and its primary objectives and a selection 
of responses stemming from the consultation period. Whilst the 
Commission seems rather enthusiastic to plug the enforcement gap, the 
majority of the respondents have the opposite opinion. What one can claim 
is that most NCAs seem to welcome the initiative. The reason hereof might 
lie in the fact that most of the responding NCAs already make use of a 
similar national legal system or has recently been involved in situations 
where the absence of lex specialis have caused some uncertainty (Ireland). It 
would indeed be more interesting if Member States lacking national merger 
regimes governing the issue had submitted their opinions. Unfortunately this 
is not the case. It could be reasonably contended that this is because most 
Member States passively share the Commission’s position.   
 
As is evident from Annex B, most law firms consider Merger Regulation 
intervention unnecessary as it would merely create uncertainty, be 
disproportionate to the perceived problem and create less incentive for 
businesses to invest in the internal market. That same view goes for most of 
the responding companies, where only Aer Lingus favour the proposal 
without further revision whilst the rest consider the control of NCMS 
unnecessary in part or in whole.  
 
Even if there has been different perceptions throughout the consultation 
period, the Commission decided (as for now) in December 2013 to only 
implement the new “simplification package”140, and as the Commission’s 
Vice President, Joaquín Almunia said in its official speech: 
 
 "The Merger simplification package shows that we are listening to 
 our stakeholders. It is the most comprehensive reform of our merger 
 procedures to date and will make them much simpler. This will 
 reduce the administrative burden and cost for business at a time 
 when it needs it most."141  
 
                                                
139 Ibid.  
140 Reforming the referral system between the Commission and national competition 
authorities, making it more business-friendly by streamlining and shortening procedures but 
without fundamentally changing the system's basic features. 
141 European Commission, Press Release, ”Mergers: Commission cuts red tape for 
businesses”, Brussels, 5 December 2013, IP/13/2014. 
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Although structural links was left outside the new merger reform, the author 
firmly believe that the consultation paper will constitute the basis for further 
discussion on how to design a system that satisfies a majority of concerned 
stakeholders, yet provide the Commission the possibility to intervene. This 
conviction will be further discussed below (see chapter 6). 
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4 Ryanair v Aer Lingus 
4.1 Introduction  
The first type of limitation in the Commission's power to intervene became 
apparent in the Ryanair v Aer Lingus decision142 and the following litigation 
at the General Court.143 The first case took place in 2006 and concerned the 
proposed acquisition of Aer Lingus by Ryanair, which was later prohibited 
by the Commission as it would significantly harm the competition. After the 
prohibition, Ryanair made several acquisitions in Aer Lingus, which 
eventually led to stake holdings of roughly 29,8%. In 2010 the EGC 
confirmed that the Commission could not act against the minority 
shareholdings under the Merger Regulation and the case was later in 2010 
under investigation by the UK Office of Fair Trading (hereinafter referred to 
as the “OFT”) and under UK law, which – unlike the Merger Regulation 
governs acquisitions of NCMS. As late as in June 2012, the OFT referred 
the issue to the Competition Commission (hereinafter referred to as the 
“CC”) for further investigation. The case was finally judged upon in August 
2013.144 Below, and in the light of the aforementioned decisions/rulings 
(collectively referred to as the Ryanair v Aer Lingus case), the impacts on 
EU merger control will be discussed.  
  
4.1.1 Background  
The Ryanair v Aer Lingus case is remarkable in many aspects. Not only are 
the findings of vital importance for the proposed changes of the European 
merger control, its length, accurate examination and information collected is 
significant.145 Having this in mind, only a brief introduction of the 
background, based on the CC’s published report on “the acquisition by 
Ryanair of a minority shareholding in Aer Lingus” 146 will be discussed.  
 
Ryanair, founded in Ireland in 1985, is the leading low-cost/low-fare 
passenger aircraft carrier in Europe serving approximately 1 500 routes in 
28 countries across Europe with an annual turnover, in March 2013, of 
€4,884 million. As for 2013 Ryanair operated 12 routes from Ireland to 
airports in Great Britain.147  
                                                
142 Commission Decision, COMP/M.4439 Ryanair/Aer Lingus 
143 Judgment of the General Court in case T-411/07 Aer Lingus v Commission [2010] ECR 
II-3691 and case T-342/07 Ryanair Holdings plc v Commission [2010] ECR II-000. 
144 Annex II, “Non-controlling minority shareholdings and EU merger control”, to the 
Commission Staff Working Document, ”Towards more effective EU merger Control”, 
SWD (2013) 239 final, Part 3/3, p. 4 f.  
145 E.g. the Commission decision M 4439 consist of 514 pages (non-confidential version) 
and the EGC ruling of 122 detailed and carefully thought through pages.  
146 Competition Commission, Ryanair Holdings plc and Aer Lingus Group plc – A report 
on the completed acquisition by Ryanair Holdings plc of a minority shareholding in Aer 
Lingus Group plc, 28 August 2013, website: www.competition-commission.org.uk.  
147 Ibid., Para. 2. 
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Aer Lingus was founded by the Irish Government in 1936 and provides 
passenger aircraft routes between mainly Ireland and the UK, but also 
(through e.g. franchise agreements) to continental Europe and the USA. In 
2006 the Irish Government held a 25,1 per cent of the shares and the annual 
turnover, in the year ended in December 2012, amounted for €1 393 million. 
As for 2013 Aer Lingus operated 4 routes from Ireland to airports in Great 
Britain.148  
 
In October 2006 Aer Lingus’ shares were admitted to the Irish and London 
stock exchange (“privatised”) and only a few days after its introduction 
Ryanair acquired a shareholding of 19,1 per cent. This pattern continued and 
in July 2008 Ryanair had acquired its current level of shareholding which 
amounts to 29,82 per cent at a cost of €407,2 million. According to Ryanair, 
the rationale behind acquiring shares in Aer Lingus was to acquire the 
company in whole and not to influence their competitive behaviour, a line of 
argumentation that Aer Lingus disagreed with. Since 2006 Ryanair has 
launched several public offers for Aer Lingus.149  
4.1.2 Judgement  
The first public offer was prohibited by the Commission on 27 June 2007 
and subsequently appealed by Ryanair to the EGC who followed the 
Commission’s line of argumentation. The Commission found that the 
proposed acquisition would lead to overlaps on more than 30 routes150 
from/to Ireland and that Ryanair’s market share would be significantly high 
which in turn could affect the consumers in terms of increased prices and 
reduction of choice. Ryanair submitted a number of commitment proposals, 
all rejected by the Commission as it considered the proposal to not identify 
the actual competition concerns.151 Moreover the Commission found that, in 
contrast to other airline merger cases, the combined representation of 
airlines would be concentrated to one single airport (Dublin) accounting for 
about 80% of all scheduled European traffic from and to Dublin.152   
 
In November 2007 Ryanair appealed the Commission’s decision to the 
EGC, claiming (in five different pleas) that the Commission had manifestly 
erred throughout the decision.  The findings of the EGC is indeed noticeable 
as the level of detail is large, addressing most of Ryanair’s argument even 
where it would not have been necessary for the outcome of the ruling 
(something you rarely see in their judgements) taking into consideration 
complex technical and economic data in its assessment yet focusing closely 
on verifying whether the Commission had established all the necessary 
facts.  
                                                
148 Ibid., Para. 3. 
149 Ibid., Para. 4. 
150 Commission Decision, COMP/M.4439 Ryanair/Aer Lingus, para. 571. 
151 O. Koch, ”Yes, we can (prohibit) – The Ryanair/Aer Lingus merger before the Court”, 
Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 3, 2010, p. 41. 
152 Commission Decision, COMP/M.4439 Ryanair/Aer Lingus, para. 59. 
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The outcome of the decision was all in favour of the Commission, rejecting 
all five pleas from Ryanair, following the Commission in all of its 40 sub-
pleas.153  
 
The second public offer took place in 2008, but was later abandoned by 
Ryanair as the Irish Government made clear that it would not support the 
bid. However, and of greater importance for the acquisition of NCMS, Aer 
Lingus requested the Commission, during Ryanair’s first public offer in 
2006, to order Ryanair to divest itself of the minority shareholding and 
prohibit the concentration pursuant to Article 8(4)154 of the EUMR. The 
Commission however, ruled that the minority shareholding did not 
constitute a concentration within the meaning of the EUMR and, as a 
consequence it did not have the power to divesture Ryanair’s minority 
shareholdings.155  
 
The decision was appealed by Aer Lingus to the EGC who had to rule upon 
the issue of “treatment of non-controlling minority shareholdings”, a blurry 
area of EU merger law (and the core purpose of this thesis).156 In its appeal, 
Aer Lingus pointed out that not ordering Ryanair to divest its entire 
minority shareholding would significantly impede competition and that the 
Commission, in the famous Tetra Laval/Sidel case157 had ordered the 
remaining shareholdings to be divested after declaring a concentration 
incompatible with the internal market. The EGC followed the Commission’s 
line of argumentation, stating that the Commission could not order Ryanair 
to divest its NCMS under current Merger Regulation as:  
 
 “/…/ the concept of concentration cannot be extended to cases in 
 which control has not been obtained and the shareholding /…/ does 
 not confer the power of exercising decisive influence on the other 
 undertaking, but forms part /…/ of a notified concentration /…/ 
 declared incompatible with the common market /…/ without there 
 having been any change of control”158 
 
 
                                                
153 O. Koch, ”Yes, we can (prohibit) – The Ryanair/Aer Lingus merger before the Court”, 
Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 3, 2010, p. 42. 
154 Article 8 of the EUMR lay down the premises for when the Commission have the power 
to decide whether a concentration may be compatible or incompatible with EU law. 
155 Competition Commission, Ryanair Holdings plc and Aer Lingus Group plc – A report 
on the completed acquisition by Ryanair Holdings plc of a minority shareholding in Aer 
Lingus Group plc, 28 August 2013, p. 3. 
156 The reader should have in mind chapter three and in particular sub-heading 3.2.1 
”Current EU practice” and the responses from the law firms who consider the existing 
toolkit sufficient. 
157 See e.g. COMP/M.2416 – ”Tetra Laval/Sidel” whereby the Commission (para. 97) said 
that: “In the light of the fact that the concentration between Sidel and Tetra, which was 
declared incompatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement 
on 30 October 2001, has already been implemented and in the light of the reasons set out 
above, it is concluded that it is necessary to order Tetra to separate itself from Sidel by 
divesting its shareholding in Sidel and to take additional appropriate measures in order to 
restore conditions of effective competition pursuant to Article 8(4) [of Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 4064/89]” (former Merger Regulation). 
158 Case T-411/07 Aer Lingus v Commission [2010] ECR II-3691, Para. 65.  
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The EGC further stressed that the Commission was right to interpret that 
Ryanair’s acquisition of a minority share can neither be regarded as “full” 
nor as “partial” implementation of a concentration pursuant to Article 8(4) 
and that the Commission, as a result, lacks the competence to order Ryanair 
to divest its minority shares.159 By emphasising such point of view, the 
Tetra Laval/Sidel merger (see footnote 144) per se gave rise to another 
situation as the transaction between the parties “had already been notified 
and implemented” and is not, as in the present case merely “proposed” and 
not de facto implemented.160 
 
Furthermore, Aer Lingus claimed that the acquisition of minority 
shareholdings constitutes a de facto control of the company as Ryanair had, 
according to Aer Lingus, the possibility to block important decisions and get 
access to confidential strategic plans and business secrets. However, this 
claim was also rejected by the EGC on several bases. Firstly, the EGC stated 
that it is not for the Merger Regulation to protect companies from 
commercial disputes or to remove uncertainty of important decision since 
such claims are rather for the competent national courts or authorities to 
decide upon. Secondly, the evidence put forward by Aer Lingus was not 
convincing enough to give the Commission the competence to make use of 
Article 8(4) as Aer Lingus could not prove that it was possible for Ryanair 
to exercise decisive influence over the company. This is e.g. shown by the 
fact that Ryanair requisitioned two extraordinary general meetings, both 
rejected by the board of directors, who instead implemented the planned 
decisions in spite of Ryanair’s opposition. Accordingly, this event directly 
illustrates, contrary to the applicant’s claim, that Ryanair was not in a 
position to impose its will.161 
 
 
 
 
                                                
159 Point 12 of the Commission Decision C (2007) 4600 of 11 October 2007 explains the 
issue in an instructive way: “The suggested interpretation [by Aer Lingus] of the 
acquisition of the minority shareholding as a “partial implementation” covered by Article 
8(4) of the Merger Regulation is difficult to reconcile with the wording of that provision, 
which clearly refers to a concentration that “has already been implemented”. As the 
decisive element of a concentration under the Merger Regulation – the acquisition of 
control – is missing, there is no concentration which “has already been implemented” and 
the parties thus cannot be required to “dissolve the concentration”. The Commission’s 
competence is limited to situations in which the acquirer has control over the target. The 
purpose of decisions under Article 8(4) of the Merger Regulation is to address the negative 
effects on competition that are likely to result from the implementation of a concentration 
as defined in Article 3 of the Merger Regulation. In the present case, such negative effects 
cannot occur, since Ryanair has not acquired, and may not acquire, control of Aer Lingus 
by way of the proposed concentration.”. 
160 O. Koch, ”Yes, we can (prohibit) – The Ryanair/Aer Lingus merger before the Court”, 
Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 3, 2010, p. 45. 
161 Case T-411/07 Aer Lingus v Commission [2010] ECR II-3691, Para. 68-72. 
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On 24 July 2012, Ryanair notified the Commission of their third intent to 
acquire Aer Lingus. Their request was, in February 2013, once again 
prohibited. 162 According to Commission Vice President Joaquín Almunda: 
 
 "The Commission's decision protects more than 11 million Irish and 
 European passengers who travel each year to and from Dublin, 
 Cork, Knock and Shannon. For them, the acquisition of Aer Lingus 
 by Ryanair would have most likely led to higher fares. During the 
 procedure, Ryanair had many opportunities to offer remedies and to 
 improve them. However, those proposals were simply inadequate to 
 solve the very serious competition problems which this acquisition 
 would have created on no less than 46 routes."163 
 
Ryanair, in turn, appealed this decision to the EGC on 8 May 2013, a case 
which is still pending before the court.  
 
Meanwhile, and after Aer Lingus request to the Commission to order 
Ryanair to divest its minority shareholdings, Aer Lingus brought the issue 
before the UK national authorities and on 15 June 2012 the OFT referred its 
inquiry to the CC for an investigation and report. The CC started its 
investigation in March 2013 and on 28 August 2013 the CC published its 99 
pages long report regarding the divesture of Ryanair’s minority 
shareholdings.164  
 
During the investigation and according to the report, the CC mainly 
investigated whether Ryanair’s shareholdings might: 
 
a) “affect Aer Lingus’s ability to participate in a combination with another 
airline;  
b) hamper Aer Lingus’s ability to issue shares to raise capital;  
c) influence Aer Lingus’s ability to manage effectively its portfolio of slots at 
London Heathrow;  
d) influence Aer Lingus’s commercial policy and strategy by giving Ryanair 
the deciding vote in an ordinary resolution; and  
e) allow Ryanair to raise Aer Lingu’s management costs or impede its 
management from concentrating on Aer Lingu’s commercial policy and 
strategy.”165 
 
 
 
 
                                                
162 Competition Commission, Ryanair Holdings plc and Aer Lingus Group plc – A report 
on the completed acquisition by Ryanair Holdings plc of a minority shareholding in Aer 
Lingus Group plc, 28 August 2013, p. 3, Para. 5.  
163 Press Release, European Commission, ”Mergers: Commission Prohibits Ryanair’s 
proposed takeover of Aer Lingus”, Brussels, 27 February 2013, IP/13/167. 
164 http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/media-centre/latest-news/2013/Aug/cc-
requires-ryanair-to-sell-shareholding, 2014-03-06. 
165 Competition Commission, Ryanair Holdings plc and Aer Lingus Group plc – A report 
on the completed acquisition by Ryanair Holdings plc of a minority shareholding in Aer 
Lingus Group plc, 28 August 2013, p. 5, Para. 13.  
 48 
After extensive and careful examination of the specific situation, the CC 
found that Ryanair’s minority shareholdings in Aer Lingus was likely to 
affect its commercial policy and strategy as Ryanair may impede or prevent 
Aer Lingus from being acquired by, or merging with another airline. In a 
time when the importance of scale to airlines and consolidation of the 
industry is evident, the possibility for Ryanair to impede or prevent 
important commercial strategies would consequently be harmful for the 
competition. Also, and contrary to the EGC, the CC formed the view that 
Ryanair was likely to affect Aer Lingus commercial policy and strategy by 
blocking special resolutions, restricting Aer Lingus’ ability to issue shares 
and raise capital and to limit Aer Lingus’ ability to manage effectively its 
portfolio of Heathrow slots. This all together would, according to Simon 
Polito, CC Deputy Chairman and Chairman of the Ryanair/Aer Lingus 
Inquiry Group, result in a: “substantial lessening of competition between the 
airlines”.166   
 
In conclusion the CC required Ryanair to reduce its shareholdings in Aer 
Lingus to 5 per cent of issued ordinary shares and established that the 
divesture should be accompanied by obligation on Ryanair not to seek or 
accept board representation or acquire further shares in Aer Lingus as long 
as clearance would not be given for the concentration under the EUMR.167   
 
Ryanair announced on 28 August 2013 (the very same day as the CC 
published its report) that it plans to appeal the decision. Whether Ryanair 
will succeed or not is for the UK national Courts to decide.168  
4.1.3 Analysis 
The Ryanair v Aer Lingus saga is indeed remarkable and interesting in many 
aspects. Not only does it provide important clarifications as to the 
interpretation of Article 3 and Article 8(4) of the EUMR, it also shows how 
EU and Member States uses different legal tools to address the same issue. 
Whilst the Commission and EGC stress the importance of having “decisive 
influence” over the target company, UK envisages a “material influence 
criterion” which, accordingly seems to be satisfied by less control than 
“decisive influence”.169 Even if the Commission’s consultation paper was 
published before the final ruling by the CC, the outcome of the Ryanair v 
Aer Lingus case provides clearer understanding of why the Commission 
sympathises a merger reform aiming at providing it the necessary legal 
toolkit to address situations like the case at hand. Consequently, if the 
Commission were to be able to use a more material approach (like the UK), 
cases similar to Ryanair v Aer Lingus would be subject for EU remedies.  
                                                
166 http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/media-centre/latest-news/2013/Aug/cc-
requires-ryanair-to-sell-shareholding, 2014-03-06. 
167 Competition Commission, Ryanair Holdings plc and Aer Lingus Group plc – A report 
on the completed acquisition by Ryanair Holdings plc of a minority shareholding in Aer 
Lingus Group plc, 28 August 2013, p. 99, Para. 8.127. 
168 UK is one of only three Member States that have statutory powers to review NCMS. 
169 For similar reasoning visit: 
http://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/PDF/Ryanair_Aer_Lingus_arti
cle.pdf, 2014-03-06. 
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Another interesting conclusion to be drawn is the EGC’s clear distinction of 
the notion “change in control”. The EGC makes it quite clear that any form 
of minority shareholdings is excluded under the EUMR unless the 
acquisition confers de facto control. This is so even if recital (20)170 of the 
EUMR seems to give the Commission and/or EU Courts rather broad 
discretion of interpretation.171  
 
As stated above in section 3.2.2, the Commission may only take pre-existing 
minority shareholdings into account under current Merger Regulation. This 
prerequisite, vis-á-vis the underlying reasoning in the Ryanair v Aer Lingus 
case together with economic theory appears to be the most important 
rationale behind the proposal. Taking the consultation paper and the 
responses thereof into account, as well as the current EU merger practice 
and the case at hand provides a solid basis to support the purpose of this 
paper. In forthcoming sections, the legal and economic aspects followed by 
concluding remarks will be highlighted. 
 
 
 
                                                
170 It is expedient to define the concept of concentration in such a manner as to cover 
operations bringing about a lasting change in the control of the undertakings concerned and 
therefore in the structure of the market. /…/ It is moreover appropriate to treat as a single 
concentration transactions that are closely connected in that they are linked by condition or 
take the form of a series of transactions in securities taking place within a reasonably short 
period of time. 
171 O. Koch, ”Yes, we can (prohibit) – The Ryanair/Aer Lingus merger before the Court”, 
Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 3, 2010, p. 45. 
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5 Impact on businesses – 
disproportionate? 
 
5.1 Introduction  
After reviewing a great amount of documentation, taking into consideration 
the consultation paper itself, most of the responses as well as doctrine and 
case law it is with certainty the author can argue that the extension of the 
scope of the merger control to acquisitions of NCMS have not met its initial 
aim as a result of poor design of certain essential elements in the proposal. 
Those elements will be studied under this section. As the Commission 
clearly states: “the paper proposes several options to achieve a regulatory 
framework without creating an undue burden for businesses”, a notion not 
shared with the majority of the stakeholders. Whilst some seem to consider 
the existing toolkit sufficient (see 3.3 above), others emphasise that the 
balance between additional burdens, increasing costs and legal certainty in 
relation to the potential positive effects is not sufficiently underpinned or 
unnecessary in whole172. The rationale behind the contradictions towards the 
Commission’s proposal is to a great extent similar and most arguments are 
somewhat linked. The concerns and impacts will be discussed in this 
chapter and should be read in the light of Annex A, and in particular 
questions 3b, 7 and 8, Annex B and Annex C combined.  
5.2 Undue burdens  
The Commission clearly points out that the administrative burden and 
possible increasing transaction costs on parties to a transaction shall be 
taken into consideration when considering the basis of discussion in the 
consultation paper.173 It is evident from most of the submitted responses that 
the benefits of an extension of the EUMR are unlikely to outweigh the 
additional costs, administrative burdens and increasing time consumption 
that such extension would pose on businesses, especially considering the 
low level of risk an acquisition of NCMS may cause to the competitive 
environment.174  
 
 
 
 
                                                
172 See e.g. Baker & McKenzie, F. Carlin, G.B. Bushell,” The Devil in the Detail: 
European Merger Regulation Reforms Increase Burden for Merger Parties”, December 
2013, http://bakerxchange.com/, 2014-03-10. 
173 See inter alia question 3b. and 8 in Annex A. 
174 Linklaters LLP, ”Response to the Commission’s Consultation on possible improvements 
to the EUMR”, 20 September 2013, p. 1.  
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Whilst most respondents only consider the additional burdens the proposal 
may pose on businesses others also advocate the impacts on the Union as a 
step to underpin their line of argumentation. According to, inter alia, Canon 
Europe; the extension of the rules is liable to, not only generate extra costs 
on businesses but also on the EU budget if the systems are not revised and 
construed in a satisfying way with clear definitions.175  
 
Considering burdens posed on businesses is inherently dependent on which 
option one desires since the mechanisms behind the systems’ differ. 
According to Gavin Bushell, partner in the European & Competition Law 
Practice Group in Brussels at Baker & McKenzie, “the notification system”, 
as it is construed today, imposes a considerable burden on the notifying 
parties in terms of timing and legal and economic costs. If this system were 
likewise to cover the acquisition of minority shareholdings the incentive for 
both European and international companies to invest (within the internal 
market) would inevitably result in investors opting out as a result of 
additional costs and burdens and thus be highly disproportionate in relation 
to the anti-competitive problems identified by the Commission. 
Furthermore, Bushell stresses that, even if both the “self-assessment 
system” and the “transparency system” appears to involve lesser 
administrative burden for companies, such systems would impose a greater 
legal uncertainty for businesses (see about legal certainty below) which 
would result in greater business costs by reason of of additional evaluation 
of a potential investment.176  
 
The majority of the responded stakeholders seem to share Bushell’s notion 
that the notification system is too far-reaching and disproportionate to the 
perceived problem and that the other systems would entail a degree of risk 
and uncertainty as the Commission would have the possibility to intervene 
after the completion of a transaction.177 As a conclusion, one can argue that 
the notification system enjoys the clear advantage of providing legal 
certainty, yet create additional burdens for companies and thus contradict 
the objective of the proposal whilst the self-assessment system and the 
transparency system would impose greater uncertainty for companies but 
less burdens (in relation to the notification system). Due to the 
Commission’s quite poor examination of the different options, the overall 
opinion seems to be that additional revision of the systems needs to be 
executed before stakeholders are able to establish a precise assessment on 
burdens and costs associated with a certain system and before accepting a 
potential new legal framework to plug the enforcement gap.  
                                                
175 Canon Europe, ”European Commission Consultation Reference: HT. 3053 – Towards 
more effective EU merger control”, p. 1. 
176 G. Bushell, “Minority Report? The EC’s Public Consultation on minority 
shareholdings”, Baker & Mckenzie, Belgium, 2013, available on: 
http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2013/08/08/minority-report- the-ecs-public-
consultation-on-minority-shareholdings/ . 
177 Vinge, ”Response of Advokatfirman Vinge to the European Commission’s public 
consultation on a proposal towards more effective EU merger control”, 11 September 
2013, p. 2. 
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5.3 Legal certainty  
5.3.1 Introduction 
The principle of legal certainty is extensively discussed in legal literature 
and can be defined in several ways. According to Elina Paunio178, the 
concept of legal certainty can be theoretically divided into i) formal and ii) 
substantial legal certainty. The first issue underpins that law and 
adjudication must be predicable in terms of e.g. clarity, stability and 
intelligibility so that concerned parties (in this case undertakings) can 
calculate, with a certain degree of accuracy, the legal outcome and its 
consequences of a specific action. Substantial legal certainty rather 
underpins that predictability is not sufficient in itself, but must also be 
accepted by the legal community in question (acceptability of judicial 
decision-making). Combined, these two theories establish a fundamental 
principle of EU law aimed at creating a possibility for those addressed to 
know the law in order to plan their actions in accordance with it.179  
 
The principle of legal certainty is frequently recurring in the merger control 
discussion and has shown to be of crucial importance also in the discussion 
of introducing a toolkit controlling structural links under EU law. According 
to the discussion set out in the consultation paper a number of parameters, 
with regards to legal certainty, read in the light of the proposed options, 
need to be considered, namely: 
 
a) the scope and substance of the Commission’s power to examine 
structural links; 
b) the relationship between the Commission and NCAs, and 
c) procedural issues180 
 
5.3.2 The scope and substance of the 
Commission’s power to examine 
structural links 
A clear definition of what, and under which circumstances, the creation of 
structural links constitutes a problematic case is not apparent in the 
consultation paper (see also 3.2.5). As a consequence the Commission opens 
up for a discussion by which it seeks to determine which acquisitions of 
minority shareholdings should qualify as “structural links” and thus be 
subject for the Commission’s scrutiny.  
                                                
178 Elina holds a Doctor of Laws degree in European law and a Master of Arts degree in 
French philology and Translation studies. Her research focuses on theoretical aspects of EU 
law and the legal reasoning of the European Court of Justice. 
179 E. Paunio, ”Legal Certainty in Multilingual EU law Language, Discourse and 
Reasoning at the European Court of Justice”, Fasnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2013, p. 
51. 
180 Commission Working Staff Document, “Towards more effective EU merger control”, 
SWD (2013) 236 final, p. 8. 
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The discussion is based on the notion of “safe harbours” which entails that 
some structural links could fall outside the scope of the Commission’s 
scrutiny provided that certain prerequisites are met. The Commission gives 
examples of jurisdictions that already review acquisitions of minority 
shareholdings that are defined by safe harbours. The United States, which 
emphasises safe harbours based on, a given level of shareholding, e.g. 10% 
or by the absence of special shareholder rights such as veto right or board 
representation. Germany, which emphasises a more substantive criterion of 
“competitively significant” control and the United Kingdom, which rather 
emphasises a principle of “material influence”.181   
 
Whichever system preferred, one can argue that is has one important 
mechanism in common, namely to what degree it provides legal certainty. 
Providing a clear definition of safe harbours, which meet the formal 
criterion of legal certainty, would in itself provide companies with a 
sufficient toolkit to examine whether their action is subject for scrutiny or 
not whilst a more imprecise definition would need e.g. guidelines to provide 
companies with the same degree of certainty. The discussion in regards to 
legal certainty and in the light of the responses seems to aim at making sure 
that the definition of safe harbours are precise, in particular if the 
Commission were to implement the self-assessment system or the 
transparency system by which they will have discretionary power to select 
cases of structural links that are prima facie most likely to give raise to 
competition concerns.182  
 
The opinions on how to appropriately define “structural links” and what 
would constitute appropriate “safe harbours” varies among the respondents. 
Aer Lingus, as only replying company, consider no need for safe harbours 
and defines structural links to cover shareholdings less than 20%.183 
Contrary, most other respondents consider this issue with caution, 
emphasising the importance of further revision and clear definitions to 
protect the fundamental principle of legal certainty. Taking into 
consideration both law firms and companies, the question regarding the 
Commission’s power to examine structural links184 seems to be the most 
fundamental question underlying the proposal.185 Even if the submissions 
vary in details, as to the level of shareholdings forming a safe harbour or 
whether a substantive or material influence shall be used, the conclusions 
are clearly the same; the concept of structural links needs to be very precise 
and carefully defined before considering implementing a new merger 
reform. 
 
 
                                                
181 Ibid. 
182 Commission Working Staff Document, “Towards more effective EU merger control”, 
SWD (2013) 236 final, p. 8. 
183 Aer Lingus Response, ”Towards more effective EU merger control”, p.7 f.  
184 See question 7 in Annex A. 
185 See e.g. Allen & Overly LLP, ”Response to European Commission public consultation 
– Towards more effective EU merger control”, 12 September 2013, p. 6. 
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5.3.3 The relationship between the Commission 
and NCAs 
As is demonstrated in the Ryanair v Aer Lingus case, the relationship 
between the Commission and the NCAs may give rise to uncertainty for 
businesses. The fact that two parallel investigations of the same issue 
resulted in unequal outcome runs counter to the one-stop shop principle 
causing unnecessary uncertainty for companies involved.186 The delineation 
between the Commission’s and the NCAs competence is of vital importance 
in the creation of a system which per se would confer jurisdictional power 
to the Commission as a step to provide companies with accurate and 
sufficient information as regards legal certainty. Accordingly the 
Commission opens up for a discussion whether the same rules as those 
under the current Merger Regulation, which provides for a clear distinction 
based on the Community dimension criterion should apply also for 
structural links. By accepting such approach, the one-stop shop principle 
would stay intact and the existing case referral system under Articles 4(4), 
4(5), 9 and 22 of the EUMR would be applicable also for structural links. 
Structural links would thus be treated in the same manner as full mergers, 
irrespectively of the differences in design.187  
 
According to the majority of the responses a system based on current 
EUMR seems to be welcome as it would warrant legal certainty without 
creating undue burdens for businesses. This is so because the current system 
is well established throughout the Union and in respective Member State 
and hence the delineation between authorities will be safeguarded. Thus, 
creating an entirely new set of rules, not based on current provisions, seems 
inconceivable for virtually all responding stakeholders.   
 
5.3.4 Procedural issues 
The third subject for discussion closely linked to legal certainty concerns 
essential elements of procedural issues and in particular the creation of a 
voluntary notification system.  Understandably this issue must be read in the 
light of the proposed options, i.e. the notification system, self-assessment 
system or transparency system as the mechanism behind the systems varies. 
Especially under the self-assessment system and transparency system the 
matter of voluntary notification is evident. Providing parties to a 
concentrative transaction the option to notify an intended acquisition of 
minority shareholdings on a voluntary basis would by definition create 
certainty and simultaneously provide the Commission the possibility to, 
depending on the nature of the transaction, investigate if considered 
appropriate.  
 
                                                
186 A. Usova, ”EU Merger Regulation Reform: Capturing Minority Acquisitions”, The 
Ukrainin Journal of Business Law, July-August, 2013, p. 40-42. 
187 Ibid. p. 9.  
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However, a system solely based on voluntary notification would not, by its 
very nature, exhaustively cover all situations of problematic structural links 
but would rather work as a supplement to one of the “main options”. 
Therefore, to be able to meet the objectives of the consultation paper it 
would not be sufficient to lean back on a system whereby it would be 
exclusively for the concerned parties to notify as such system would merely 
provide legal certainty in one direction and thus counteract the intention of 
the proposal.188  
 
Moreover, the Commission examines various solutions on how to address a 
voluntary notification system in a way feasible for the majority of 
stakeholders while still holding the option to intervene ex-post in cases of 
structural links where concentrations can be realised before obtaining a 
clearance decision but could still be subject for investigation at a later stage. 
Likewise, the Commission opens up for discussion in regards to introducing 
a standstill obligation whereby parties to a transaction, not yet implemented, 
could be notified voluntarily and, if deemed necessary trigger a standstill 
obligation (similar to the system used in the United Kingdom).189 The 
reaction of most stakeholders seems to be that ex-post intervention is 
directly harmful for legal certainty as it would be hard for undertakings, 
with adequate certainty, to know if to proceed their plan of action or not, 
especially if the set of rules are not accompanied with clear guidelines. That 
same view goes for introducing a standstill obligation, as acquiring a 
minority shareholding is merely a way to get access to assets or technical 
information and should therefore not be “punished” in the same way as a 
full acquisition. 
 
Finally, the Commission asks whether a time limit should apply to open an 
investigation on structural links. Most respondents deem a time limit vital to 
ensure legal certainty and emphasise that such time limit should be as short 
as possible, yet provide the Commission enough time to intervene from the 
time the information of an acquisition exists in the public domain. 
Accordingly a time limit between two to four months seems reasonable 
given most of the answers. Many respondents base their argumentation in 
the UK merger regime which employs a four months time limit (which has 
shown to work well for a number of years) but stress, at the same time that, 
given the limited number of  “problematic cases”, it could be even shorter. 
In any circumstance, a clear definition of when the time limit is triggered 
and how long the Commission will have the possibility to intervene is 
essential to safeguard legal certainty.190  
 
 
                                                
188 Commission Working Staff Document, “Towards more effective EU merger control”, 
SWD (2013) 236 final, p.10. 
189 Ibid. 
190 See e.g. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, ”Response to the European Commission’s 
public consultation of 20 June 2013 – Towards a more effective merger control – 
Submission of 12 September 2013, p. 8 and Allen & Overly LLP, ”Response to European 
Commission public consultation – Towards more effective EU merger control”, 12 
September 2013, p. 7. 
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Considering most responses submitted by stakeholders, implementing either 
of the systems, without further revision, would lead to increased uncertainty 
and unpredictability. To mitigate this shortcoming the Commission needs to 
further elaborate a suitable system that provides a clear balance between 
power and certainty.191 Summing up, to provide adequate legal certainty the 
Commission seems to be required to introduce a system providing 
companies the possibility to voluntary notify, accompanied with detailed 
guidelines, clearly explaining under what circumstances and during which 
time period the Commission considers ex-post intervention appropriate 
alongside a clear motivation for introducing a standstill obligation. 192  
5.4 Chapter summary  
Considering the Commission’s tone of voice throughout the consultation 
paper the necessity of plug the enforcement gap is of utter importance. The 
Merger Regulation is, according to the Commission, not sufficient to 
systematically prevent anti-competitive effects stemming from structural 
links and thus its current toolkit does not have the appropriate means to 
tackle “all sources” of harm to competition and consumers.193 Even if the 
Commission, by establishing Annex I194 and Annex II195 of the consultation 
paper, aims on providing practical information of potential anti-competitive 
effects based on both economic theory and on the basis of examples the 
final outcome is not sufficient for anxious stakeholders who also make this 
rather clear in their responses. 
 
Nevertheless, by examining the responses carefully one can argue for, and 
establish a trend towards, which most of the respondents, seems to be 
willing to proceed. Accordingly, stakeholders do not seem to reject the 
proposal in whole, but rather illuminate the importance of clear and proper 
definitions to ensure that burdens and legal certainty for undertakings is 
safeguarded and accounted for.196 As a result it is evident to say that the 
Commission had the possibility to go further, but failed in doing so as it did 
not introduce a system by which the definition of central concepts where 
sufficiently underpinned. 
 
                                                
191 A. Usova, ”EU Merger Regulation Reform: Capturing Minority Acquisitions”, The 
Ukrainin Journal of Business Law, July-August, 2013, p. 40-42. 
192 See e.g. Orange, ”Orange reply to the consultation ”Towards more effective EU merger 
control”, September 2013, p. 3. or Philips, “Response of Koninklijke Philips N.V. to 
Consultation on possible improvement of the Merger Regulation – “Towards more effective 
merger control”, 12 September 2013, ref. no: HT.3053, p. 10. 
193 Commission Working Staff Document, “Towards more effective EU merger control”, 
SWD (2013) 236 final, p.3. 
194 Available on: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2013_merger_control/consultation_annex1_e
n.pdf.  
195 Available on: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2013_merger_control/consultation_annex2_e
n.pdf. 
196 This is a consolidated view recognised by the author. Whilst some respondents seem to 
reject the proposal in whole, others advocate further discussions. 
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The possible effects of the proposal will be further elaborated in the 
forthcoming and final section in which the author will establish concluding 
remarks, possible outcomes for future discussions and an alternative 
solution, taking into consideration all the abovementioned as a step to create 
guidance on whether, and possibly when, the Commission will have the 
possibility to address certain structural links.  
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6 Concluding remarks 
6.1 Introduction 
 
As portrayed above and according to both the Commission and concerned 
stakeholders, anti-competitive effects may arise in connection with minority 
shareholdings (let so be to a greater or lesser extent). Consequently, one can 
claim that there is an enforcement gap as identified by the Commission.  
Nonetheless, an important question inevitably follows: is merger regulation 
intervention proportionate to its aim, i.e. to create a more business-friendly 
Union without posing undue burdens and/or less legal certainty on 
undertakings?  
 
According to Russo197, the answer appears to depend on whether minority 
shareholdings participation in companies’ equity capital is analysed from: i) 
the classic perspective of protection or ii) the undue anti-competitive 
advantage approach. On the one hand, protecting minority shareholders’ 
rights are of utter importance for the development of everyday (Union) 
economic life. This approach is evident, not least by the development of 
European company law instruments, by which one can grasp that minority 
shareholdings should be protected against e.g. possible mismanagement, 
change of company structure and/or objectives or exclusion from strategic 
decision-making, the notion of “dictatorship of the majority”. On the other 
hand and on the opposite, minority shareholdings may instead lead to hardly 
detectable competitive advantages (where minority shareholders exploit 
their position), which in turn could give rise to unfair practice by one or 
more undertakings. In any case, one can quite easily argue that the line 
between the two is very thin and as a consequence, the reader needs to 
acknowledge the existence of the two perspectives.198 By accepting the 
existence of an enforcement gap and the very thin line between protecting 
minority shareholdings vis-à-vis unfair competitive advantages the purpose 
of the thesis can be further elaborated.  
 
Now, considering all the abovementioned, the author firmly believes that 
there is no right or wrong answer for satisfying the purpose of this thesis, 
but rather considers it a question of “the proposal’s suitability in relation to 
its objectives”. Therefore the analysis will mainly focus on “looking 
forward” – what is to come – and how will this affect businesses. 
 
 
 
                                                
197 PhD, University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Centre for Law & Economics (ACLE). 
198 F. Russo, ”Abuse of Protected Position? Minority Shareholdings and Restriction of 
Markets Competitiveness in the European Union”, World Competition, Vol. 29(4), 2006, p. 
608 ff.  
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6.2 What is to come? 
Insufficient clarity, lack of balance, poor design, reduced legal certainty; the 
list of arguments against the Commission’s proposal goes on. Nonetheless 
the discussion does not seem to be over just yet, rather the opposite. 
Regardless of the mechanism and the composition behind a certain system - 
providing the Commission the authority to intervene in acquisitions of 
NCMS - it is fairly easy to say that the signals stemming from the 
Commission’s stance, either via Commissioner Almunia, other Commission 
officials or, first and foremost the consultation paper itself is a clear-cut 
acknowledgment of the existence of an enforcement gap in current Merger 
Regulation which needs to be dealt with199.  
 
It should be remembered, when the Commission published its consultation 
paper, it labelled it: 
 
 "The proposal aims to make EU merger control even more business-
 friendly by cutting red tape and streamlining procedures” 
 
Given the compilation of material in this thesis it is fair to say that even 
future proposals may fail to live up to this “lofty” ideal as the measures 
proposed are likely to place significant burdens on companies along with 
reducing legal certainty if the Merger Regulation is not altered in 
consideration of already established procedures. The reasons for companies 
to invest in minority shareholdings are many, among others to gain access to 
specific assets and/or new technologies or receive additional financial 
resources, without, having that said, confer control in the target company. 
As Rusu properly points out, the various possibilities of substantive 
amendments of the Merger Regulation to also govern minority 
shareholdings without capturing “wrong” structural links are many.200 A 
first and fairly easy solution could simply be to relax the thresholds of 
“decisive influence”. However, such modification would in turn impose a 
change of definition of the term “concentration” and as a consequence force 
companies to become comfortable with a new definition that could lessen 
legal certainty. As been described above, most law firms and companies 
consider plugging the enforcement gap rather unnecessary. However, if the 
Commission decides to do so the most essential component lies in clear 
definitions of central concepts (e.g. “structural links, “safe harbours” 
“problematic cases” etc.), without altering current definitions in order to 
avoid undue burdens for concerned undertakings.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
199 C. S. Rusu, ”Eu Merger Control and Acquisitions of (Non-Controlling) Minority 
Shareholdings – The State of Play”, CLaSF WP Series No. 10, February 2014, p. 31. 
200 Ibid. 
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A second solution could be to learn from Member States (and other States 
for that matter), including but not limited to, the UK which emphasises a 
“material influence” approach or Germany which advocates the idea of 
“competitively significant influence”. Yet again, such approach would most 
probably pose burdens on both companies and Member States not familiar 
with the particular system. All things considered, it seems that everything 
boils down to: - how exactly should the Commission define structural links 
in a way that suit companies without posing undue burdens and minimise 
the likelihood of reducing well-established procedures?    
 
The substantive alterations presented in the consultation paper do indeed 
call for further practical guidance on how either of the suggested systems 
and its ancillary concepts should be defined and should thus, not be 
overlooked. The ex-ante methods of control, i.e. the notification system and 
the (selective) transparency system both have upsides and downsides for 
businesses. The former would widely extend the scope of the Merger 
Regulations which entails that it would capture structural links that might 
not be problematic and therefore be costly and time consuming for both the 
Commission and businesses, then again it would provide legal certainty as it 
would be construed on already established principles. The latter would 
provide the Commission with excessive discretionary power as it would be 
authorised to identify, by its own means, what it consider to be, prima facie 
structural links that might raise competition concerns. Such system could 
reduce burdens for companies since they would merely be obliged to file a 
short form. However, if the Commission opts, by reason of e.g. third parties, 
to investigate it might both be costly and reduce legal certainty for 
companies. Although the ex-post method of control or the self-assessment 
system will not entail a prior-notification obligation for undertakings and no 
standstill obligation to comply with, the Commission would yet again be 
provided a great deal of discretion. Nevertheless, this system seems to be 
the most reasonable for companies as it would be based on an undertaking’s 
internal decision to file a notification by reference of e.g. uncertainty 
whether the merger may fall within the ambit of the Merger Regulation or 
not. However, the downside would be the potential decrease in legal 
certainty and lawyers’ costs for assessing whether the acquisition is covered 
by EU merger legislation or not.  
 
All the above observations do have their reasons to support and reasons to 
oppose. Although introducing self-standing provisions covering acquisitions 
of NCMS are likely to plug the enforcement gap I believe that further 
revision is of vital importance to satisfy the “objective to make EU merger 
control even more business-friendly”. Providing a system whereby the 
Commission will have the possibility to scrutinise structural links without 
posing undue burdens or less legal certainty on businesses needs to be done 
gradually, one step at a time, not by introducing an entire new set of rules 
for companies to comply with. As has been emphasised above, the 
consultation period started in 2013 is an important statement by the 
Commission which somewhat demonstrates in which direction it are likely 
to proceed. However, that being said, it is necessarily not the right way to 
proceed.  
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Nonetheless, the conclusion can be drawn that the Commission is likely to, 
in some way or another, let it be by following the set path in the 
consultation paper or by further experiment via a White Paper, thereby 
continuing its struggle to acquire jurisdictional competence in regards to 
structural links.201 
 
Summing up, I believe that we will see an amended set of rules within quite 
a near future. If only considering the proposed systems in the light of the 
responding law firms and companies, it appears that the majority favours a 
self-assessment system alongside the possibility to notify on a voluntary 
basis accompanied with well-defined safe harbours, time limits and clear 
guidelines. Furthermore it seems desirable, to the greatest extent possible, to 
safeguard legal certainty by maintaining high thresholds  (20% or above) 
and apply the same substantive tests, one-stop principle and referral system 
as is done today. 
 
Considering the above observations I would finally like to introduce an 
alternative system, similar to that Ireland proposed in its response but with 
one additional element. It could be describes as a “notification-self-
assessment” system. Although the wording of this system is contrary to the 
meaning of the Commission’s definition of the systems respectively, it 
seems that most companies would like to keep and safeguard the current 
referral and notification systems to warrant legal certainty (as proposed 
under the notification system) but not go as far as simply extending the 
scope of current Merger Regulation to also cover (non-controlling) minority 
shareholdings. This is where the self-assessment system comes into play as 
it would provide companies, by their own means, to notify a minority 
shareholding acquisition if they are uncertain of its nature and compatibility 
with EU law. If companies were to make use of current procedures and yet 
have the possibility to voluntarily notify a merger or acquisition this would 
minimise both the burdens and costs to such an extent that it would not be 
mandatory for companies to notify if they are certain that the acquisition 
would not fall within the ambit of EU law, yet provide them the possibility 
to warrant legal certainty. This would of course only work as long as central 
concepts are well defined which is for the Commission to work out before 
introducing a new legal toolkit that companies may consider acceptable. All 
in all this specific area of merger control is of complex nature as it entails 
that diverse interests and needs must be considered with precaution before 
being realised. I truly hope that this thesis will help to create greater 
understanding of the complexity between the desire to implement a system 
providing the Commission the possibility to intervene in certain cases of 
structural links and the desire to create a more business-friendly union that 
safeguards the attractiveness of the internal market and is looking forward to 
see what the future will bring. 
 
 
 
                                                
201 Electronic answer from the Commission dated 2014-03-25: ”We shall be publishing a 
White paper before the summer”. 
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Annex A 
 
Questions on structural links:  
 
“1. In your view would it be appropriate to complement the Commission's 
toolkit to enable it to investigate the creation of structural links under the 
Merger Regulation?  
 
2. Do you agree that the substantive test of the Merger Regulation is an 
appropriate test to assess whether a structural link would lead to 
competitive harm?  
 
3. Which of the three basic systems set out above do you consider the most 
appropriate way to deal with the competition issues related to structural 
links? Please take into account the following considerations:  
 
a) the need for the Commission, Member States and third parties to be 
informed about potentially anti-competitive transactions,  
 
b) the administrative burden on the parties to a transaction,  
 
c) the potential harm to competition resulting from structural links, both in 
terms of the number of potentially problematic cases and the impact of each 
potentially harmful transaction on competition;  
 
d) the relative ease to remove a structural link as opposed to the difficulties 
to separate two businesses after the implementation of full merger;  
 
e) the likelihood that anti-competitive effects resulting from an already 
implemented structural link can be eliminated at a later stage.  
 
4. In order to specify the information to be provided under the transparency 
system:  
 
a) What information do you consider necessary to enable the Commission 
and Member States to assess whether a case merits further investigation or 
to enable a third party to make a complaint (e.g. information describing the 
parties, their turnover, the transaction, the economic sectors and/or markets 
concerned)?  
 
b) What type of information which could be used by the Commission for the 
purpose of the transparency system is readily available in undertakings, e.g. 
because of filing requirements under securities laws in case of publicly 
listed companies? What type of information could be easily gathered?  
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5. For the acquirer of a structural link, please estimate the cost of filing for 
a full notification (under the selective system in case the Commission 
decides to investigate a case, or under the notification system). Please 
indicate whether the costs of a provision of information under the 
transparency system would be considerably less if the information required 
were limited to the parties, their turnover, the transaction and the economic 
sectors concerned.  
 
6. Do you consider the turnover thresholds of the Merger Regulation, 
combined with the possibility of case referrals from Member States to the 
Commission and vice versa, an appropriate and clear instrument to 
delineate the competences of the Member States and the Commission?  
 
7. Regarding the Commission's powers to examine structural links, in your 
view, what would be an appropriate definition of a structural link and what 
would constitute appropriate safe harbours?  
 
8. In a self-assessment or a transparency system, would it be beneficial to 
give the possibility to voluntarily notify a structural link to the Commission? 
In answering please take into account the aspects of legal certainty, 
increased transaction costs, possible stand-still obligation as a consequence 
of the notification, etc.  
 
9. Should the Commission be subject to a limitation period (maximum time 
period) after which it can no longer investigate/intervene against a 
structural link transaction, which has already been completed? If so, what 
would you consider an appropriate time period for beginning a Commission 
investigation? And should the length of the time period depend on whether 
the Commission had been informed by a voluntary notification?”202 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
202 Commission Staff Working Document, Towards more effective EU merger control, 
SWD (2013) 236 final, p. 11 f.  
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